TOWARD A NATIONAL ESTIMATE OF POLICE USE OF NONLETHAL FORCE*

Research Summary Despite frequent calls for national data on police use of force, the literature is dominated by unrepresentative samples from a small number of primarily urban jurisdictions, inconsistent definitions of force, and differing universes for the computation of rates. Among 36 publications that report on the amount of nonlethal force used by the police, rates vary from 0.1% to 31.8%. To improve our ability to estimate the amount of nonlethal force in the United States, we employ data from two sources: the Police‐Public Contact Survey (PPCS) and the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails (SILJ). Using comparable measures from these surveys, we estimate that the police use or threaten to use force in 1.7% of all contacts and in 20.0% of all arrests. The PPCS accounts for 87% of the total force incidents derived from both surveys. Males, youths, and racial minorities report greater rates of police use of force, but multivariate models highlight the role of potentially provoking behaviors on the likelihood and severity of force. Policy Implications Improved estimates from the combined PPCS‐SILJ samples support the proposition that police use force infrequently and at the lower end of the severity scale. Reported amounts of force vary based on respondent race, sex, and age, but greater variation in police use of force is explained by suspect behavior. The combined PPCS‐SILJ sample provides a more representative basis for estimating the rate and correlates of nonlethal force. State and local estimates from less representative samples can be interpreted in light of these findings. National estimates could be improved by devoting sufficient resources to support the collection of agency records of both lethal and nonlethal force.     

Legal Truths and Falsities*

This paper has a two‐pronged thesis. First, laws should be understood as making factual claims about the moral order. Second, the truth or falsity of these claims depends as much on the content of the law as on whether the lawmaker has political authority. In particular, laws produced by legitimate authorities are successful as laws when they guide subjects' behavior by giving subjects authoritative reasons for action. This paper argues that laws produced by legitimate authorities accomplish this task (i) by being on their own sufficient to change the moral state of affairs, which (ii) thereby generates for people new moral reasons to act that they can read right off of the legislation.     

Social Structure and Citizenship: Examining the Impacts of Social Setting,Network Heterogeneity,and Informational Variables on Political Participation

In this study, we develop a model of the interplay between sociostructural determinants of an individual's discussion behavior, such as the setting of primary discussion networks (work, church, and volunteer groups) and the nature of discussion (i.e., level of exposure to non-like-minded ideas), and individual-level outcomes, such as hard news media use, political knowledge, and participation in political processes. In doing so, we synthesize many of the different and sometimes competing models that political communication scholars have used to examine the link between more macroscopic sociological variables and the individual-level behaviors that political scientists often focus on. Data to test our theoretical model come from a national telephone survey conducted in October and November 2002. Our analysis showed that the social setting in which citizens discuss politics is an important antecedent of political participation. Discussion networks as part of volunteer groups, for example, indeed serve as important networks of recruitment. In other words, discussing politics frequently in this setting is positively and directly linked to political activity. The impact of conversational networks in church and work settings on participation, however, is only indirect. In fact, our data show that the impact of church and work networks on political participation is to a significant degree mediated by the different viewpoints that individuals are exposed to when they discuss politics in these settings.     

Understanding UKIP: Identity,Social Change and the Left Behind

In this article we explore the structural shifts which help explain the emergence of UKIP as a major radical‐right political force in Britain. There are two distinct, but related, aspects to this story. The first is the changes to Britain's economic and social structure that have pushed to the margins a class of voters who we describe as the ‘left behind’: older, working‐class, white voters with few educational qualifications. The second is long‐term generational changes in the values that guide British society and shape the outlook of voters. These value shifts have also left older white working‐class voters behind, as a worldview which was once seen as mainstream has become regarded as parochial and intolerant by the younger, university‐educated, more socially liberal elites who define the political consensus of twenty‐first‐century Britain. We then move to consider the political changes that have further marginalised these voters, as first Labour and then the Conservatives focused their energies on recruiting and retaining support from middle‐class, moderate swing voters. Finally, we show how UKIP has developed into an effective electoral machine which looks to win and retain the loyalties of these voters. Finally, we discuss the longer‐term implications of the radical‐right revolt, which has the potential to change the nature of party competition in Britain in the 2015 election and beyond.