Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement

This article deals with the question of how a high level of compliance with consumer protection legislation designed to prevent financial losses can be secured. We use a theoretical framework based on economic analysis of law to address some of the key policy options, such as proactive and reactive monitoring, providing officials with postdetection enforcement discretion, administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions, and facilitating actions by victims and third parties. On the basis of our theoretical framework and a classification of jurisdictions into different groups (models of enforcement policy), we identify some key elements of an enforcement regime and indicate in what circumstances a particular solution can be expected to be more or less cost effective.     

The Shared Perception of Social Contexts and Its Conditions for Possibility

Pragmatist reinterpretations of both deliberative-communicative theory and legal positivism point out the mentalist fallacy entailed by these prevalent models. I argue that pragmatist approaches imply analogous erroneous beliefs since they presuppose as given the shared perception of social contexts. Therefore they take for granted the shared interpretation of social problems and shared selection of common goals. Hence I advance the necessity of inquiring into the possibility conditions for a shared perception of social contexts. This would entail the organization of institutional incentives meant to extend the scope and inclusiveness of the immediate perception of social context expressed by different agents.     

Progressive Taxation,Fairness, and Compliance*

This paper examines the preferences for income tax progressivity, other tax fairness issues, and tax compliance of a national sample of nearly six hundred heads of U.S. households. The results reveal that mean public preferences for fair tax burdens are close to actual effective tax rates; however, the similarity between average preferred and actual effective tax rates masks an underlying schism between three groups: (I) those who believe tax rates should be higher for upper income persons (steep progressives), (2) those who prefer mildly progressive tax rates (mild progressives), and (3) those who believe tax rates should be flat (“flatraters). The analysis includes demographic and fairness profiles associated with tax rate preferences. Attitudes about the overall fairness of the income tax, exchange equity with the federal government, government spending, tax complexity, and tax compliance behavior are examined. In general, respondents' stated preferences for vertical equity approximate the current distribution of the income tax burden, yet there is a relatively high consensus that the income tax is unfair, especially with regard to the ability of wealthy taxpayers to exploit loopholes to avoid paying their fair share, and that respondents regard their own tax burdens as unfair. These results suggest that providing information to the public about the relative amount of income taxes paid by upper income individuals and the effects of recent limitations on “loopholes” could improve public attitudes about the fairness of the income tax and tax compliance.     

The EC's Budget in the Move to a Single Market

This article will consider the approach of 1992 and the single market from the perspective of the community budget. It will begin by recalling the distinctive characteristics of that budget and the way in which argument about it dominated the EC agenda throughout the 1980s up until the Brussels European Council meeting held between 11 and 13 February 1988. It will then consider the relationship between the decisions taken in Brussels and the wider issue of the creation of a single market. In particular, it will examine the issue of resource availability and will argue that the budgetary framework established in Brussels significantly contributed to modifying the extent and nature of community policies in a way which will continue to be felt after 1992. It will conclude by arguing that the process initiated in Brussels has widened the acquis communautaire and altered the balance between autonomy and interdependence in the community in the run-up to the creation of the single market.     

Sovereign Immunity in an Economic Theory of Government Behavior

The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 put government on an equal footing in tort law with private individuals. It also provides a very broadly defined immunity for any public function of a discretionary nature. While economists argue that immunity does not minimize social costs, this analysis outlines a theoretically optimal mix of liability and immunity. Discretionary governmental policy must be immune as it establishes principles of government conduct. Tort liability then insures cost-minimizing policy execution. This theory of state behavior links a number of leading/controversial immunity cases that otherwise exhibit no consistent thought.