SYMPOSIUM ON CHANGING MODES OF GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: ACTION AND RHETORIC

This symposium grew out of the sub‐theme, ‘New Modes of Governance in Public Sector Organizations’, of the European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) Conference held in Ljubljana in July 2004. Our aim was to provide a forum to discuss the policy and practice and the space between in public sector management and governance within Europe.     

ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC SECTOR: PARADOX OR POSSIBILITY?

Our study explores the possibility for the enactment of entrepreneurial leadership in the English public sector under the Labour government’s modernization agenda. To substantiate our analysis, we draw upon data gathered from leaders in three public sector arenas – the National Health Service, secondary schools, and further education (FE) colleges. Our study proposes a definition of public sector entrepreneurship that extends beyond existing literature. In essence, we contend that public sector entrepreneurship is characterized by the combination of three distinct agencies: ‘stakeholder’, ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘political’. The public sector entrepreneur identifies market opportunities within the political landscape, optimizes the performance‐enhancing potential of innovation for the public sector organization, and carries stakeholders in a way that both permits risk and recognizes the stewardship of public sector resources.     

Aggressive Patrol: A Search for Side-effects

Recent interest in the possible deterrent effects of aggressive or proactive policing raises the issue of such strategies' consequences for individual liberties and police-community relations. This study examines the latter—specifically, the effects of four neighborhood-level measures of an aggressive patrol style on citizens' evaluations of police and citizens' propensities to report crimes. The results suggest that, for most citizens, aggressive patrol has almost no effect on either evaluations or reporting behavior. Surprisingly, one form of proactive patrol, the neighborhood rate of suspicion stops, seems to have a positive effect on the evaluations of police made by young black men.     

Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors

When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the “staring match” logic captured by divide‐the‐dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.