TERRORISM,POLITICS, AND PUNISHMENT: A TEST OF STRUCTURAL-CONTEXTUAL THEORY AND THE “LIBERATION HYPOTHESIS”*

The sentencing literature generally has been characterized by an inability to explain Significant amounts of the variance in sentencing outcomes. Two major theoretical explanations have addressed this issue: structural-contextual theory and the “liberation hypothesis.” Structural-contextual theory suggests that the components of the justice system traditionally work somewhat independently of one another. This theory suggests that variance explained in sentence outcomes will increase appreciably when components function with greater interdependence—a so-called “tightening” or “coupling” effect. Such tightening supposedly takes place when particular cases are given high priority for investigation and prosecution. An example of this situation might be domestic terrorism. The liberation hypothesis suggests that the greater the severity of an offense, the less likely judges or juries will feel free to follow their own sentiments regarding guilt and punishment. As a consequence, the ability of legal variables to predict variation in sentence length will be greater as crime severity increases. This study compares a sample of officially designated terrorists matched with nonterrorists convicted of the same federal offenses. OLS regression and structural equation modeling procedures are used to compare the levels of explained variance for the two groups. The results indicate strong support for the basic premises of both theories. Explained variance for the terrorist sample is more than four times greater than the explained variance for the nonterrorist sample. Further analysis shows that explained variance is highest for terrorists who have committed a high-severity offense and lowest for nonterrorists who have committed a low-severity offense. The subsequent addition of other predictor variables available only for the terrorist sample further increases the explained variance and provides additional support for the liberation hypothesis.     

Unravelling the ‘devolution paradox’: Citizen preferences for self-rule and for shared rule

Recent survey research has revealed a ‘devolution paradox’: some citizens who favour stronger regional governments inconsistently desire policy uniformity across regions and state-wide intervention in policy provision. It is argued and empirically shown that preferences for regional authority can be broken down into preferences for self-rule – that is, for autonomy for the region – and for shared rule – that is, for collaboration between regional and national governments. Drawing upon the International Constitutional Values Survey, which includes 4,930 respondents from 142 regions in eight countries, it is also shown that preferences for self-rule and shared rule have different impacts. Preferences for self-rule translate into a preference for regional reform that strengthens regional autonomy, whereas preferences for shared rule drive preferences for fiscal transfers from richer to poorer regions. These results are important because they can explain why citizens who are in favour of more regional authority may support an apparently ‘paradoxical’ set of policy outcomes.     

Regulating Science and Technology: The Case of the UK Biotechnology Industry*

This paper considers the current performance and future prospects of the UK biotech industry, particularly the biomedical sector. The central argument is that the performance of the UK biotech industry cannot be understood in isolation from the European system of regulation and, increasingly, the international regulatory environment, and from what is happening elsewhere in the regulation of science – particularly in the U.S. To develop this argument, it adopts as its conceptual framework Kim and von Tunzelmann's network alignment approach following Radosevic. It explores the link between regulatory policies and the biotechnology production system – networks between academic research, biotech firms, and large pharmaceutical companies.     

Encouraging Tax Compliance With Positive Incentives: A Conceptual Framework and Research Directions*

Drawing on learning and social psychological research, we identify the processes by which positive incentives induce compliance with regulatory laws, using tax as a specific example. We evaluate the likely effects of various positive incentives on four different dimensions of compliance decisions: instrumental consequences, normative considerations, internalized motivation, and allegiance to authority. Linking incentives specifically to compliant behavior invokes a cost/benefit analysis, lowers intrinsic motivation and allegiance to authority, and requires authorities to monitor citizens and to distinguish between compliant and noncompliant behaviors. The alternative is to present the incentives as an attempt by the enforcement authorities to cooperate with the citizens. This method is less likely to invoke cost/benefit calculations; requires less intervention by authorities; and increases intrinsic motivation, consideration of normative issues, and allegiance to authorities. Prior research suggests that respectful treatment and praise may be more effective incentives for inducing long-lasting compliance than are materialistic incentives because people have a strong tendency to reciprocate actions they receive from authorities. Our analysis leads to proposals for program implementation and evaluation and raises some theoretical questions that need additional research.     

The Organizational Context of Legal Control

This article examines interorganizational variation in determinants of police arrest decisions. Drawing on Wilson, we identify four types of police agencies by cross-classifying levels of bureaucratization with professionalism. Evidence from the analysis indicates that factors influencing arrest decisions are conditional on the organizational contexts in which such decisions occur. In different types of police agencies, officers respond to similar situations differently. Hence, "global" decision-making models are we incomplete than incorrect. We argue that consideration of the contexts within which discretion is exercised is necessary for advancing our understanding of decision-making in justice system agencies.