Juvenile Criminality And Semi-Criminality: Learning From Victorian Perceptions And Responses

This article focuses on media reportage of offensive juveniles, past and present, to elicit lessons that the twenty-first century can learn from the Victorian past in terms of diversionary responses. How to prevent vulnerable juveniles sliding into dangerous criminality is a continuing preoccupation: the issue explored in this article relates to the creation of the identity of the criminal juvenile. In utilising the concept of semi-criminality to label certain types of juvenile anti-social behaviour the Victorians avoided actual criminalisation of socially offensive but, in legal terms, minor behaviours. The reasons for and negative consequences of the abandonment of this concept by the modern age are explored, including the reconceptualisation of where responsibility for juvenile offending lies in the modern era.     

Miscarriage of Justice? Postcolonial Reflections on the ‘Trial’ of the Maharajah of Baroda, 1875

This article revisits the Baroda Incident 1875, providing a detailed examination of the Enquiry or ‹trial’ for the first time, and locating that examination in the wider socio-cultural context of the nineteenth century British Empire (especially the Raj) and the exporting of the ‹British’/English legal culture to the Empire. The implications of the establishing of British principles of justice, including the value placed upon Indian-generated evidence and testimony by the courts, are explored, in order to establish the Baroda Incident as a significant miscarriage of justice. Using historical methodologies as well as postcolonial insights, it demonstrates that the concepts of justice on which the British prided themselves were intrinsincally racialised as well as gendered, with profound modern resonances. Dr. Judith Rowbotham is a Reader, School of Arts and Humanities, Nottingham Trent University.     

Competitive Liberalization,Competitive Imperialism,and Intellectual Property

Aggressive pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) by major and minor trading powers alike challenges the conventional wisdom in favor of such pursuit – competitive liberalization. An equally plausible explanation for an active bilateral and regional trade agreement policy, one which effectively de-emphasizes multilateralism, may be competitive imperialism. The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is one area in which new provisions, going beyond multilateral rules, are being negotiated and written into FTAs and CUs. Such provisions may yield insights into which characterization of bilateralism and regionalism – competitive liberalization or competitive imperialism – is more apt. Rice Distinguished Professor, The University of Kansas, School of Law, Green Hall, 1535 West 15th Street, Lawrence, KS 66045-7577, USA. Tel. +1-785-8649224. Fax. +1-785-8645054. www.law.ku.edu. J.D., Harvard (1989); M.Sc., Oxford (1986); M.Sc., London School of Economics (1985); A.B., Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar (1984-86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, and Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Author, Modern GATT Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2005), International Trade Law: Theory and Practice (2nd ed. 2000, 3rd ed. forthcoming 2007-08), and Trade, Development, and Social Justice (Carolina Academic Press 2003). I am thankful to my Research Assistant, Mr. David R. Jackson (B.A., George Mason University, 1992; J.D. Class of 2007, University of Kansas), for his indispensable help on this work. I also am grateful to Dr. Mohammed El Said, University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN), for his consistent support and friendship, and for what he has taught and continues to teach me about international trade and intellectual property.     

Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity

It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation‐of‐powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ‘mixed government’—a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ‘estates’ representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation‐of‐powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule‐making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ‘regulatory estate’. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need.