Party Competition and Government Formation in Germany: Business as Usual or New Patterns?

The process of coalition formation following the 2017 Bundestag election was the most difficult in German post-war history. For the first time, Germany saw negotiations fail, a minority government being discussed as a real possibility, and the federal president involved as formateur in coalition politics. The aim of this contribution is to explain why government formation was so intricate after the 2017 election. To this end, we trace patterns of party politics and the development of the German party system since 2013. We then study general patterns of government formation at the regional and national levels since the 1990s and evaluate whether these have changed with the advent of the right-wing populist party, Alternative for Germany. Our analysis of the 2017–2018 government formation is based on a novel expert survey of the policy profiles of German parties on various issue dimensions, conducted in 2017. The results show that the continuation of the incumbent coalition government of Christian and Social Democrats was the most likely outcome, and that the Social Democrats were indeed able to enforce a surpassing share of their policy positions in the final negotiation rounds.     

The effect of political sophistication and party identification on voter–party congruence. A comparative analysis of 30 countries

Partisanship and cognitive mobilization are generally seen as independent and counter-balancing influences on vote choice. While the former is typically regarded as a shortcut, reducing the need for close ideological congruence with one’s preferred party, the latter is associated with increasing levels of political sophistication and the importance of ideological proximity in voter decision-making. This paper tests the strength of these arguments in comparative perspective using data from Wave 3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Our results show that in general higher levels of political sophistication are associated with higher levels of voter–party ideological congruence and that a strong party identification reduces this proximity. For voters with both high levels of sophistication and strong partisanship, however, congruence remains high. In a second step we examine whether these relationships are affected by the complexity of the party environment. Our findings show that party system size has no effect on levels of ideological congruence at the individual level, and this holds for different levels of voter sophistication. We conclude that for the most part voter sophistication and party identification are best seen as counter-weights in determining vote choice.     

The Effect of Political Science Education on Political Trust and Interest: Results from a 5-year Panel Study

Citizenship education has evolved substantially in recent decades, with a rapid proliferation of education forms and approaches. The currently available evaluation studies, however, do not allow us to determine what kind of approach can be considered as a best practice for schools and education systems. In this article, we rely on the results of a 5-year panel study to investigate the long-term effects of various forms of citizenship education. Using the Belgian Political Panel Survey (n = 3,025), a three-wave longitudinal panel survey of 16-, 18- and 21-year-old Belgian late adolescents and young adults, we determine which citizenship education effort (i.e., classroom instruction, being a member of a school council, and an open-classroom climate) has a long-term effect on political trust and political interest. The results suggest that classroom instruction, the presence of an open-classroom climate, and being a member of a school board are positively related to political trust. We also find that classroom instruction and being a member of a school board are significantly associated with higher levels of political interest. We close with some observations on what these findings imply for citizenship education policies.     

Online clustering,fear and uncertainty in Egypt’s transition

Does the uncertainty associated with post-authoritarian transitions cause political and social polarization? Does ubiquitous social media exacerbate these problems and thus make successful democratic transitions less likely? This article examines these questions in the case of Egypt between the 11 February 2011 fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the 3 July 2013 military coup, which overthrew President Mohamed el-Morsi. The analysis is based on a Twitter dataset including 62 million tweets by 7 million unique users. Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, we demonstrate how clusters of users form and evolve over time, the density of interactions between them, and the flow of particular types of information through the clustered network structure. We show that the Egyptian Twitter public developed into increasingly isolated clusters of the like-minded which shared information unevenly. We argue that the growing distance between these clusters encouraged political conflict and facilitated the spread of fear and hatred, which ultimately undermined the democratic transition and won popular support for the military coup.     

Enhancing Efficiency or Crying over Spilled Milk: The Benefits of Reform

We analyze the welfare gains from the reform of existinggovernment-induced distortions. Our results provide support forpolicies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economicdistortion. Welfare gains over the status quo exist wheneverderegulation occurs. The threat of deregulation can induce amonopoly or cartel to modify its behavior, so a reform policy canprove beneficial even if reform does not actually occur. Optimalpolicy with commitment in fact allows a monopoly to deterderegulation. The possibility of reregulation does not reverse ourresults; the per period welfare gain from reform remainsundiminished.     

From kinship to magic circle: the London commercial law firm in the twentieth century

The authors trace the successive transformations of the large London commercial law firm, which entered the 20th century as a small group of partners, typically from one or more family groups, surrounded by a large group of working class clerks who performed much of the ‘professional work’. After mid-century this firm based on kinship and class hierarchy gave way to a larger firm consisting of non-kin partners selected meritocratically presiding over an increasing band of assistant solicitors and trainees recruited on the basis of their educational credentials and taking part in a promotion-to-partnership tournament. In the last decade of the century, the central institutions and understandings of this meritocratic firm gave way to a constellation of larger, less stable, and increasingly supra-national aggregations, in a setting pervaded by a fascination, both instrumental and narcissistic, with rank and image.     

Problems of reliability and validity in criminal justice research

Reliability and validity are critical standards of scientific inquiry. This analysis directs attention to problems of reliability in data collection and to problems of validity in measuring two key criminal justice variables: the offense and the sentence. The discussion and empirical analysis indicate that reliability of official information sources in criminal justice cannot be assumed. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the criterion of validity is even more elusive. This elusiveness is demonstrated in the operational definition of criminal offense, an important predictor variable, and in attemps to operationally define the criminal sanction, i.e., the disposition of charges against convicted defendants. These considerations suggest that research in the sentencing area may not be directed to the subject at hand and that research results should be interpreted with “scientific” caution.