Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

首都市民职业价值观状况研究报告

2008年,北京市社会科学院对首都市民职业价值取向状况进行了专题调研,结果表明:首都市民珍视工作稳定性,职业理想倾向于个人经济利益和自我价值实现,崇尚不断创新、乐于敬业的职业精神和职业态度,体现了新时期积极向上、忠于职守的从业价值观,形成了由物质实现、自我实现向社会实现逐层递进的事业成功观,认同通过个人努力获取成功的事业进取现.     

Why Do States Commission the Truth? Political Considerations in the Establishment of African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Although the use of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) has grown considerably over the last 3 decades, there is still much that we do not know concerning the choice and the structuring of TRCs. While the literature has focused primarily on the effects of TRCs, we examine the domestic and the international factors influencing the choice of a commission in sub-Saharan Africa from 1974 to 2003 using pooled cross-sectional time series. We find that states which adopted a TRC prior to South Africa were generally repressive centralized regimes which used the truth commission as political cover. However, since South Africa’s TRC, democratizing states have been more likely to adopt a truth commission as a form of transitional justice.

Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy

Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed “split-intolerance,” and with uncertain preferences over policy. Lower courts may compete by investing costly effort in legal quality to make their rules more attractive. In equilibrium, lower courts may initiate conflict even when the odds of success before the high court are remote. Surprisingly, lower courts grow more likely to create conflict as the high court's split-intolerance increases; however, split-intolerance can also incentivize greater lower court effort. I present qualitative evidence illustrating the model's explanatory power.     

Should algorithms be regulated by government?

There has been, and continues to be, an explosion in the use of algorithms across the economy and society. There are growing concerns about how algorithms are being used and whether they are accountable. This article reviews the literature on the issue of algorithms in several key areas, such as fairness, accountability, and transparency. The article examines arguments on why algorithms should be regulated, and it explores the available literature to identify how a potential Canadian regulatory framework may be developed.     

An economic theory of the regulation of preliminary measures

Preliminary measures adopted early in litigation are crucial for plaintiffs, given existing court delays and changing economic environment, but can also harm a blameless defendant. Therefore, some form of regulation is needed to minimize the harms that can result and discard non-optimal measures. Law and economic scholars have suggested that courts should control requests for preliminary measures, but this form of regulation fails to explain existing legislations, both in civil law and common law countries. This article argues that non-optimal preliminary measures can be more efficiently filtered through a strict liability regime, and that their judicial control should be residual.     

Bargaining for justice: A means to resolve competing justice claims

In many types of social situations, individuals defend their claims to a portion of the rewards by arguing that they are just. Although a great deal of research demonstrates that individuals differ in their distribution preferences and thus their beliefs about what is fair, the literature curiously omits consideration of the consequences of these differences, especially the conflict they may engender. This paper first reviews the few attempts to address such justice conflict. The limitations of these approaches suggest concerns to be addressed in an alternative framework. The paper presents a theoretical discussion of this alternative that integrates assumptions about distribution preferences, justice beliefs, conditions fostering the emergence of justice conflict, and elements of negotiation processes as a basic framework for predictions about the bargaining strategies individuals may employ to resolve competing justice claims.