Challenge Funds in International Development: Definitions,Variations and Research Directions

The use of challenge funds to promote economic and social development continues to grow but has been the subject of relatively little research. This article draws on institutional economics (particularly principal‐agent theory) to define challenge funds and review how they differ from other development funding mechanisms, taking into account their purpose, financial terms, interagency relationships, screening processes, selection mechanisms, implementation and risk sharing characteristics. It then draws on web‐based data for 50 challenge funds to analyse variation in some of these characteristics. The paper identifies evaluability as an important influence, including the relative importance attached to promoting the financial performance of grantees relative to the indirect social benefits of their activities. We conclude with suggestions for further research into the design and performance of challenge funds. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Diversity Works: The Effects of Coalition Composition on the Success of Lobbying Coalitions

Lobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.     

Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

Research on regulation and regulatory processes has traditionally focused on two prominent roles: rulemaking and rule‐taking. Recently, the mediating role of third party actors, regulatory intermediaries, has started to be explored – notably in a dedicated special issue of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The present special issue extends this line of research by elaborating the distinction between formal and informal modes of regulatory intermediation, in the specific context of transnational multistakeholder regulation. In this introduction, we identify two key dimensions of intermediation (in)formalism: officialization and formalization. This allows us to develop a typology of intermediation in multistakeholder regulatory processes: formal, interpretive, alternative, and emergent. Leveraging examples from the papers in this special issue, we discuss how these four types of intermediation coexist and evolve over time. Finally, we elaborate on the implications of our typology for regulatory processes and outcomes.