Economic growth and political extremism

Public Choice - We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extreme political parties. In our model, extreme parties offer short-run benefits to...     

Using Big Data and Algorithms to Determine the Effect of Geographically Targeted Advertising on Vote Intention: Evidence From the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election

We develop a new conceptualization of political advertising effects by looking at the effect of the marginal advertising dollar during the heat of presidential campaigns. We argue that in contrast to other studies investigating effects of political ads, our approach is more apt to capture the natural environment in which political ads are encountered during a presidential campaign. We focus on the intense inundation of political ads voters are confronted with in swing states in the weeks leading up to the presidential election, and argue that it is unclear a priori whether we should expect advertising to affect vote intention in that critical circumstance. We empirically validate this hypothesis using a trove of data from the 2012 campaign: daily polling in media markets around the country, detailed data on all registered voters in the country, all TV advertisements by market and exact airtime, and the entire Twitter corpus. We find that neither overall increases in advertising spending nor partisan imbalances in spending expanded the candidates’ electorate. In fact, total Designated Market Area (DMA)-level spending significantly moderates a negative relationship between spending advantages and advantages in vote intention, suggesting a boomerang effect of additional spending late in the campaign. In closing, we discuss the ramifications of our findings for future research, and stress the importance of research tracking advertising effects.     

The impact of associational life on trust in local institutions: a comparison of 57 Swiss municipalities

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of associational life on individual political trust in 57 Swiss municipalities. Our hierarchical regression models show that individual political trust is not only affected by individual associational membership but also by the exchange between associations and local political authorities in a community. In other words, if political authorities and associations are linked at the community level, citizens will place more trust in their local institutions. Furthermore, we find clear evidence for the rainmaker hypothesis: our results show that the positive effect of a vibrant connection between associational life and local politics on political trust is not solely confined to the associational members themselves, but rather indicate that the structure of the local civic culture fosters political trust among members and non-members at the same time. However, the internal democratic processes of associations have no effect on individuals’ trust in local political institutions.     

“Boundary Delineation” in grenzüberschreitenden Policy‐Netzwerken: Primat der “Policies” oder der “Polity”? Das Fallbeispiel des Policy‐Netzwerks zur 28‐Tonnen‐Limite

Zur Analyse neuer Verhandlungssysteme der Politikformulierung hat sich seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre das Konzept der Policy‐Netzwerke herausge‐bildet. Verschiedentlich wurde diesen Netzwerkkonzepten in der Literatur vorgeworfen, dass bei dynamischen networking‐Prozessen nicht zwischen inhaltlichen und institutionell geprägten Aktivitäten unterschieden werden kann. Inwiefern sich diese These aufrecht erhalten lässt und welche Implikationen sie für die Ausdifferenzierung von grenzüberschreitenden Netzwerken birgt, ist Gegenstand des vorliegenden Beitrags. Die quantitative Netzwerkanalyse der schweizerischen Schwerverkehrspolitik im europäischen Umfeld über drei Phasen hinweg stützt die Institutionalismus‐These, wonach sich das grenzüberschreitende Netzwerk entlang der staatsrechtlich‐institutionellen Dimensionen Schweiz‐EU sowie staatlich‐parastaatlich/privat ausdifferenzierte. Die Sektorzugehörigkeit dagegen wirkte in dieser Konstellation erst innerhalb formal‐institutionell definierter Strukturen differenzierend.     

Flexible pensions for politicians

It may be difficult to motivate politicians in their last term. To solve this problem, we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets, flexible pensions, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the potential reelection chances of the politician. Pensions depend on the price in the information market and thereby motivate the politician to act in a socially optimal manner. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of flexible pensions.     

Decentralization and Fiscal Discipline in Sub-national Governments: Evidence from the Swiss Federal System

This article analyses the relationship between decentralizationand the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralizationand federalism can be associated with both an expansive anda dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralizedstructures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt dueto inherent competition between the member states and the multitudeof veto positions which restrict public intervention. On theother hand, decentralization has been claimed to contributeto an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functionaland organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, oftendebt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number ofactors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way.Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economicdevelopment, the architecture of state structure has no impacton debt. However, the degree of decentralization influencesdebt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession,administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economicalbudgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states.     

Promotion of the Agricultural Sector and Political Power in Austria

In most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted. Two different viewsare presented to explain why: the Chicagoan view (“Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis”)and the Virginian view (inefficient outcome of political bargaining). A vertically structuredempirical model of the Austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses. Quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers/taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented.     

The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Aspiration of gastric contents in hanging with typical position of the strangulation cord and free suspension]

Among 193 cases of hanging from the years 1978 to 1991 examined in the institute of Forensic Medicine of the Freie Universit?t Berlin 8 cases with an aspiration of stomach contents had been reported. Herefrom 3 cases were hanging in a "typical" position (suspension point at the back of the head, free suspension of the hanging body) and did not undergo resuscitation. By free suspension of the hanging body the observed massive aspiration of gastric contents only can be explained by an at least partly open connecting passage between the laryngeal entry and the entrance of the oesophagus. The post mortem flowing in of stomach contents as well as a post mortem gastro-oesophageal peristalsis seem not to be able for explicating the findings. Differences in important parameters (e.g. gastric contents, alcoholization) to the cases of hanging without aspiration were not found. Even by free suspension of the body, running noose and point of suspension in the back of the neck sometimes the connection between larynx and oesophagus may stay open, especially when by emesis a high pressure is produced by the stomach.