The design principles of institutions that visibly and significantly affect citizens’ lives are likely to be politically salient. Popular support for these principles is in turn crucial for institutional viability and effectiveness. Transboundary pandemics are a case in point. Understanding citizens’ preferences regarding the design of international alliances set up to mass-produce and distribute vaccines is likely to determine citizens’ subsequent cooperation with vaccination campaigns. This study explores Germans’ preferences for international COVID-19 vaccine alliance design principles. We conducted a conjoint experiment at a recurring cognitive moment in many pandemics’ cycles, between the initial outbreak and a more devastating but still-unknown second wave, when infection rates were very low, yet no policy solutions had been developed. We analyzed preferences regarding four building blocks: (1) alliance composition (size; EU-centrism), (2) alliance distribution rules (joining cost; vaccine allocation), (3) vaccine nationalism (cost per German household; coverage in Germany) and (4) vaccine producer confidence (origin; type). Distribution rules, political ideology and personal perceptions of pandemic threat matter little. But a larger alliance size and dominant EU-country composition increase alliance support. And vaccine nationalism is key: support increases with both lower costs and larger coverage for own-nation citizens. Moreover, support goes down for Chinese and American producers and increases for Swiss and especially own-nation producers. In sum, a realist and technocratic outlook is warranted at the cognitive stage in pandemic cycles when no solutions have been found, yet the worst already seems to be over, as national self-interest reigns supreme in popular attitudes.
Carbohydrate-deficient transferrin (CDT) is the most specific serum marker of chronic alcohol abuse so far. There is little knowledge about extreme CDT values of >20% and the more >30% CDT.
Methods
Serum CDT/transferrin ratios from 19,236 serum samples sent to our laboratory for routine CDT analysis were determined by HPLC. About 75% of these serum samples were from traffic or employment medicine investigations. A CDT value frequency histogram was computed and extreme CDT values were clinically validated.
Results
Fourteen thousand four hundred and sixty-one CDT results were normal (≤1.7%) and 4775 increased (1.8–36.9% CDT). Most frequent normal and increased results were 0.9% CDT (n = 1964) and 1.8% CDT (n = 356). CA. 70% of the pathological results were between 1.8% and 5.0% CDT, ca. 88% between 1.8% and 10.0% CDT, and 98% between 1.8% and 20.0%. CDT values >20.0% appeared in 79 cases and results >30.0% in two cases (33.8% and 36.9%). In each case of CDT values >20%, chronic alcohol abuse was the underlying cause as confirmed by anamnestic exploration.
Conclusions
CDT/transferrin ratios are usually <20%. Higher values can appear in rare cases. CDT results >30% can be due to alcohol abuse but should be considered as remarkable single observations. Visualization of the transferrin isoform patterns by HPLC allows the detection of pathological transferrin isoform patterns and of genetic transferrin variants. This is essential for a reliable interpretation of (extreme) CDT values. CDT analysis by immunoassays without physico-chemical confirmatory analysis is no longer acceptable. 相似文献
Transfer restrictions have a long tradition in professional sports but came under heavy attack in recent years (e.g. Bosman
ruling, Monti system). Based on a bargaining model with stochastic player productivity, we show that less restrictive transfer
rules reallocate ex post bargaining power from players to clubs. This reallocation is efficient and in the ex ante self-interest
of players. The right to charge transfer fees enables clubs to insure their players. The players, in turn, benefit by converting
risky future income into riskless current income. Overall, player utility is higher under more than under less restrictive
transfer rules.
Using data from a panel survey of members of two generations, this study explores observed change in policy opinions across a 9-year span and respondents' recollections and explanations of their self-perceived attitude shifts. In general, remembrances corresponded poorly to opinions as originally expressed, with respondents perceiving that they were more attitudinally stable than was actually observed. When attempting to reconstruct their past political attitudes, individuals appeared to rely on simple rules of thumb such as one might employ to account for another's behavior. Finally, respondents readily supplied explanations for their self-perceived attitude history, even when those perceptions directly contradicted observed opinion change. It is argued that these results are not artifacts of survey measurement problems. Instead, they indicate that policy attitudes generally do not have strong cognitive representations, are eminently changeable, and once they are changed, an individual's cognitive autobiography is revised so as to render the changes invisible. 相似文献
Zusammenfassung Die Frage der Einklagbarkeit von Fehlern bei der Umweltvertr?glichkeitsprüfung (UVP) ist
weiterhin ein rechtlich unsicheres Terrain und damit für komplexe Gro?vorhaben ein erheblicher
Risikofaktor. Mit dem Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz (UmwRG) hat der deutsche Gesetzgeber Regelungen erlassen,
die zwar in gewissem Umfang eine Einklagbarkeit von UVP-Fehlern vorsehen, deren Auslegung jedoch umstritten
ist. Der vorliegende Beitrag behandelt die Frage, ob und ggf. in welchem Umfang das UmwRG Drittbetroffenen
ein subjektives Recht auf Einklagbarkeit von UVP-Fehlern einr?umt. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass insoweit
zwischen Umweltschutzvereinigungen und sonstigen Beteiligten zu differenzieren ist und dass eine Erweiterung
der Einklagbarkeit von UVP-Fehlern über die beiden in §4 Abs. 1 UmwRG genannten F?lle (Nichtdurchführung
einer UVP bzw. Einzelfallvorprüfung) nach der klaren gesetzlichen Festlegung und der bisher ergangenen
Rechtsprechung nicht in Betracht kommt. 相似文献
Do voters polarize ideologically when radical views gain political legitimacy, or does the rise of radical voices merely reflect societal conflict? We argue that elite polarization as signaled by radical parties' first entrance into parliament leads to voter divergence. Immediately after the election, legitimization and backlash effects mean that voters on both ideological sides move toward the extremes. In the longer term, this polarization is solidified because of radical parties' parliamentary presence. A panel study of Dutch voters shows that the 2002 parliamentary entrance of a radical‐right party indeed led to immediate ideological polarization across the political spectrum. Estimating time‐series cross‐sectional models on Eurobarometer data from 17 countries (1973–2016) shows an additional long‐term impact of radical‐right party entry on polarization. The presence of radical voices on the right has polarizing effects, illustrating how such institutional recognition and legitimization can have a far‐reaching impact on society. 相似文献