Managing the negotiation agenda

Conclusion The agenda is one of the main structural elements of negotiation, in addition to such questions as site, identification of participants, and elements of timing. Together, they answer the who, what, when, and where questions. As with other aspects of negotiation, the agenda can be used either manipulatively to enhance leverage or to improve the prospects for agreement and the possibilities for mutual gain. In most cases, it will be used both ways, reflecting the nature of negotiation as a mixed-motive situation.Although it can be instrumental to volunteer as a sole source to write the agenda, in most cases it becomes a joint activity to construct a consensual basis for subsequent negotiation. In these situations, agenda-building becomes one of the pre-negotiation activities that set the tone for the relationship (Saunders, 1985). In other situations, the parties may engage in actual negotiation without a formal or written agenda. When this occurs, the risks and uncertainties may be high but the party who appreciates the importance of the informal agenda has a tremendous advantage.Whether one plans it or not, during the course of negotiation the parties will discuss a finite set of issues in some sequence and from a particular perceptual framework. Consciousness of the universality and centrality of the agenda is prerequisite to guiding negotiation to a successful conclusion. William R. Pendergast is Associate Dean at Boston University's Metropolitan College, 755 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02215, where he teaches graduate courses and executive development seminars on negotiation. He is preparing research on power and influence, and on strategic choice in negotiation.     

The establishment of the presence and group classification of sperm in mixed stains by isoelectric focusing

The article deals with experimental data on design of the method used for detection of sperm, blood and vaginal secretions according to isoelectric points of acid phosphatases, differential diagnosis of ABO group antigens in "mixed" stains as well as detection of phenotype of red cell acid phosphatase by isoelectric focusing method.     

Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry

The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve fair competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of unfair foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on Economics and Power organized by the FWS Institute of Zug and held at Interlaken, Switzerland in July 1988.     

Tollison costs and technological innovation: The case of environmental regulation

This paper departs from the Tullock cost paradigm that views competition for monopoly privilege as a welfare-inimical process that wastefully dissipates preexisting producers' surplus and, occasionally, leads to inefficient increases in costs and counterproductive uses of scarce resources. The potential availability of rent-seeking may bring about the elimination of inefficient regulatory regimes that retard or prevent the introduction of cost-reducing innovations. Air quality management is but one area in which innovation rent-seeking holds promise for concrete welfare gains. Researchers may wish to focus on institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the transactions costs and free rider disincentives to the formation of a coalition to seek innovation rents. An example of such a mechanism might be a joint venture that requires all venture members to engage in lobbying and to contribute to collective research efforts. These unaddressed questions await future research.The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Gordon Tullock, Robert D. Tollison, Michael T. Marlow and J.R. Clark. The usual caveats apply. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of their employers.     

Inner-city birth rates following enactment of the Minnesota parental notification law

An increase in birth rates to Minneapolis minors following the enactment of a parental notification law was examined. A well-publicized link between increasing birth rates and the law is shown to have been premature. Birth, abortion, and population data by age, race, and region suggest that the increasing birth rate in Minneapolis was not related to parental notification, but rather to a growing racial minority population.Preparation of this article was supported in part by an Aldeen Grant from Wheaton College. The authors wish to thank the Minnesota Center for Health Statistics, particularly James Wigginton and Carol Vargas, for their considerable work to provide birth, abortion, and population data in a form suitable for the current analysis. The authors also thank Americans United for Life for purchasing the data and providing them to the authors.