Demokratie, Autokratie und die regulative Gestaltung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in Entwicklungsländern

This paper investigates into the political determinants of trade policy regulation in developing countries. When choosing between the trade policy instruments tariffs and quota governments consider the effects of these policies on their political support from interest groups and voters. It is argued that quantitative restrictions become increasingly less attractive as a country democratizes. Instead, motives of revenue generation gain importance. Therefore, the likelihood of democratic governments choosing quota is smaller than for their autocratic counterparts. Empirical tests based on a sample of 75 developing countries for the years 1979–1998 support the hypothesis.     

IPO effects: corporate restructuring when a firm goes public

The public affairs of a firm issuing an initial public offering (IPO) are a critical part of the corporate restructuring efforts which firms face during the process of going public. In this paper, Bowman and Singh's (1993) definition is used to illustrate how issuing an IPO is a significant form of corporate restructuring. Public affairs are critical during both the pre‐IPO phase and during the period leading up to the IPO, as the firm must negotiate a heavily institutionalised process to successfully complete the issue. Here, the six‐year life of ‘Deja News’ is used as a way to illustrate and explain the public affairs during the process of preparing for and issuing an IPO. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.     

MAINTAINING A UNITARY STATE: COUNTER-TERRORISM,SEPARATISM, AND EXTREMISM IN XINJIANG AND CHINA

This essay reviews the history of Uighur related terrorism in Xinjiang as well as elsewhere in China and discusses the political motivations and effectiveness of the Chinese government in suppressing terrorism. The essay assesses both the motivations of the Uighurs engaged in terrorism, as well as the motivations for counter terrorist by the Chinese authorities. A key objective of the essay is to determine what are the political and other reasons that drive the Chinese government’s counter terrorism strategy and tactics and whether these have been effective or counter-productive. The essay assesses the counter terrorism strategy of the Chinese government in Xinjiang Province and across China, the political motivations for the strategy, the impact and success or otherwise. The essay discusses if the government is combatting terrorism, or separatism, or extremism, the confusion of these terms, and whether this has had any impact on the effectiveness of counter terrorism.     

Human Capital and Administrative Burden: The Role of Cognitive Resources in Citizen-State Interactions

One means by which the state reinforces inequality is by imposing administrative burdens that loom larger for citizens with lower levels of human capital. Integrating insights from various disciplines, this article focuses on one aspect of human capital: cognitive resources. The authors outline a model that explains how burdens and cognitive resources, especially executive functioning, interrelate. The article then presents illustrative examples, highlighting three common life factors—scarcity, health problems, and age-related cognitive decline. These factors create a human capital catch-22, increasing people's likelihood of needing state assistance while simultaneously undermining the cognitive resources required to negotiate the burdens they encounter while seeking such assistance. The result is to reduce access to state benefits and increase inequality. The article concludes by calling for scholars of behavioral public administration and public administration more generally to incorporate more attention to human capital into their research.