Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

We consider two bidders with asymmetric valuations competing to win an exogenous prize. Capital markets are imperfect, such that the contestants possibly face a liquidity constraint. We show that aggregate investments are lower if at least one bidder has a liquidity constraint, even if the low-valuation bidder possibly increases his/her investments. Furthermore, the effect of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint on competitive balance is ambiguous. However, if the low-valuation bidder is constrained, greater wealth unambiguously increases competitive balance. Surprisingly, if the low-valuation bidder has a constraint, a tighter constraint can increase his/her profit.     

Cardiac Sudden Death as a Result of Acute Coronary Artery Thrombosis During Chemotherapy for Testicular Carcinoma

Abstract: We report the first acute coronary fibrin thrombus arising upon atherosclerosis detected at autopsy in a man receiving chemotherapy for testicular carcinoma. The decedent was a smoker with no other known atherosclerotic risk factors. Histology revealed superficial atherosclerotic plaque erosion with endothelial necrosis and no intraplaque hemorrhage. A focus of intimal lymphoid infiltrates was noted away from the plaque. These findings raise the possibility of chemotherapy‐induced vascular damage as a factor in thrombogenesis. A review of Pubmed was performed which documented clinical reports of an association of chemotherapy with acute cardiac ischemia but no well described autopsy findings. Our case highlights the need for careful assessment of the coronary system in chemotherapy patients dying suddenly, particularly in the absence of significant atherosclerotic risk factors. Such postmortem examination will ensure thorough death investigation and may elucidate the pathogenesis of thrombosis with potential reduction in cardiac ischemic risks of chemotherapy patients.     

Institutional Choice and Policy Transfer: Reforming British and German Railway Regulation

The notions of "policy learning" and "policy transfer" have become increasingly influential in the public-policy literature. By utilizing a comparative analysis of regulatory change in the railways in Britain and Germany, it is argued that an institutional approach adds to the understanding of "learning" and "transfer" processes, as well as explaining which institutions mattered as Britain and Germany adopted distinctively different regulatory regimes. The institutional approach points to the constraints involved in the selection of regulatory design ideas and, by assessing three institutional factors that structure relationships between the policy domain and its environments, suggests that in the case of railway privatization in Britain and Germany in the 1990s, it was the structure of the political-administrative nexus that centrally shaped why particular policy options were selected while others were neglected.     

Aesop With Variations: Civil Service Competency as A Case of German Tortoise and British Hare?

Among the most widely used stereotypes in the contemporary literature on public management reform is to portray German administrative policy as that of a slow-moving 'tortoise' in contrast to the fast-moving reform 'hare'. Taking civil service competency as a point of analysis, this article questions the validity of these widely held assumptions. It does so in three steps. Following a brief comparative narrative of competency initiatives in the German and British higher civil services, the article explores to what extent the observed 'Aesop with variation' pattern can be explained. It suggests that the variations can only to a limited extent be explained by 'civil service competency exceptionalism' and that there therefore seems to be something wrong with the way that Germany and the UK are conventionally categorized in the international public management reform literature.