Demokratie, Autokratie und die regulative Gestaltung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in Entwicklungsländern

This paper investigates into the political determinants of trade policy regulation in developing countries. When choosing between the trade policy instruments tariffs and quota governments consider the effects of these policies on their political support from interest groups and voters. It is argued that quantitative restrictions become increasingly less attractive as a country democratizes. Instead, motives of revenue generation gain importance. Therefore, the likelihood of democratic governments choosing quota is smaller than for their autocratic counterparts. Empirical tests based on a sample of 75 developing countries for the years 1979–1998 support the hypothesis.     

IPO effects: corporate restructuring when a firm goes public

The public affairs of a firm issuing an initial public offering (IPO) are a critical part of the corporate restructuring efforts which firms face during the process of going public. In this paper, Bowman and Singh's (1993) definition is used to illustrate how issuing an IPO is a significant form of corporate restructuring. Public affairs are critical during both the pre‐IPO phase and during the period leading up to the IPO, as the firm must negotiate a heavily institutionalised process to successfully complete the issue. Here, the six‐year life of ‘Deja News’ is used as a way to illustrate and explain the public affairs during the process of preparing for and issuing an IPO. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Decentralisation of service delivery as adopted by the Central District Council in Botswana

The Central District Council (CDC) in Botswana expanded service delivery to five sub‐districts in January 2000 using a model adapted from the South Somerset District Council, UK. As little data were available on the effectiveness of decentralised service delivery, officials and councillors throughout CDC were interviewed regarding their perception of the process. They not only provided recommendations for enhanced implementation but also identified some of the tensions resulting from it. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Legislative influences in Japanese budgetary politics

Following World War II (W.W.II), Japan adopted a democratic parliamentary system. Since its formation in 1955 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had monopolized Japanese legislature (Diet) for over 35 years. However, it is said that at the center of the budgetary process was the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Elite bureaucrats rather than politicians are typically seen as the agenda-setter. The action of politicians, in particular members of the LDP, to influence the budgetary resource allocation has been largely unexamined. This paper empirically examines the influence of the LDP on the supplementary budget formation and on the revenue-sharing. We find that the LDP had a significant impact on the budget formation. Further, we find that the LDP manipulated transfers from the central government to local governments presumably to maintain its electoral positions.     

Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.