Cost-benefit Analysis of Infrastructure Projects in an Enlarged European Union: Returns and Incentives

We consider results of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in a large sample of ISPA (Structural Instrument for Pre-Accession countries) projects co-financed by the European Union to support investment in transport and environment. The research focus is on the empirical analysis of the variability of financial and economic rates of return and how to integrate this information in the EU co-financing mechanism. We investigate to what extent the variability of expected returns and of EU co-financing rates is due to structural project characteristics (sectors, countries) or to other unexplained factors, including errors in the appraisal. We find that while the absolute level of grants is related to sectors, the EU co-financing rate depends on countries. There is no justification in economic analysis of such a country bias, because the variability of economic rate of returns is unrelated either to sector or country factors. These findings points to the need of a more consistent approach to evaluation and EU co-financing of infrastructure supported by the EU funds. We suggest possible improvements, based on the idea to offer an incentive to projects with high-expected economic␣rates of return relative to a benchmark and showing ex-post the realism of the initial analysis.      

The Limits of Digital Interpretation: Semantic Versus Syntactic Connectedness

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The concept of reasonability is key in Umberto Eco’s interpretive semiotics, where it...     

Legitimacy for a Supranational European Political Order—Derivative,Regulatory or Deliberative?

This paper discusses some models purported to legitimise a European supranational legal order. In particular, the author focuses on an application of the so-called regulatory model to the complex structure of the European Community and the European Union. First of all, he tackles the very concept of legitimacy, contrasting it with both efficacy and efficiency. Secondly, he summarises the most prominent positions in the long-standing debate on the sources of legitimation for the European Community. Thirdly, in this perspective, he analyses several, sometimes contradictory, notions of the rule of law. His contention is that we can single out five fundamental notions of the rule of law and that some but not all of them are incompatible with or oppose democracy. Finally, the paper addresses the regulatory model as a possible application of the rule of the law to the European supranational order. The conclusion is that the regulatory model should be rejected if it is presented as an alternative to classical democratic thought, though it might be fruitful if reshaped differently and no longer assessed from a functionalist standpoint of deliberation.