A ‘Fool’ and His Sugar-Sweetened Beverage are Soon Taxed

Tax policy informed by Libertarian paternalism suggests that taxes should be levied on non-‘rational’ choice (i.e., where a person makes a ‘foolish’ decision by their own internal standards). In respect of excise taxes on sugar sweetened beverages, the regressivity of such policies can then be justified by reference to a progressive health effect, since the poor are more sensitive to changes in price and disproportionately tend to consume sugar sweetened beverages. However, as it currently stands, that conclusion is based merely on a presumption of irrationality of the poor as a class and neither the relative price of goods subject to such taxes, nor the associated ‘welfare loss’ from the levy of the tax, have been systematically measured. Such a presumption of non-‘rationality’ in food choice only holds with respect to persons who are not bound by relative prices of food, namely the wealthy. Accordingly, it is reasonable for scholars to consider the levy of excise taxes on unhealthy food consumed primarily by the wealthy (e.g., foie gras) as a ‘nudge’ toward a healthier food choice. Furthermore, the poor are rational agents capable of analysing and comparing relative prices of food products taking into account the health effects. As various scholars have now proposed in medical journals, any incremental tax levied on the poor in respect of sugar-sweetened beverages should be offset, for example, with a credit for healthy foods including fruits and vegetables.     

Law and Institutional Legitimacy in the Practice of Human Rights

The Heart of Human Rights develops an account of human rights as legal entities that serve important moral purposes in a legitimate international human rights practice. This paper examines Allen Buchanan’s general concept of institutional legitimacy and aims to expand that concept by emphasizing its connection with several ideas developed in the book about the nature and function of a system of international human rights. When it incorporates those ideas, Buchanan’s ‘Metacoordination View’ can be seen to set a standard of legitimacy not only for assessments of an international scheme of human rights institutions, but also for the basic institutional structures of domestic states. Furthermore, we can see how the nature and function of human rights in the international practice of human rights bears on legitimacy assessments of particular domestic institutions.     

What is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family Resemblances

The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt to understand the general concept hate speech. And it does so using a range of well-known methods of conceptual analysis that are distinctive of analytic philosophy. One of its main aims is to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that hate speech is best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important implication is that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate speech, including but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason to embrace an understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech laws on the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred.