Why triggers fail (and what to do about it): An examination of the unemployment insurance extended benefits program

During periods of high unemployment, many workers exhaust their unemployment insurance (UI) benefits before regaining employment. To help alleviate this problem, Congress created the extended benefits (EB) program, expanding the number of weeks of benefits available to UI recipients in high unemployment states. The EB program operates by “triggering on” additional weeks of benefits in states where unemployment and UI benefit receipt are above federally established thresholds. We analyze the performance of the EB program by creating a series of policy simulations using weekly UI claims and unemployment data from the program's inception in 1970 through the most recent economic expansion in 2005. Overall, we find that EB triggers, as currently constructed, fail as a policy tool for extending UI benefits. Minor adjustments to the triggers are unlikely to be effective. We develop an alternative set of “fix point” triggers that allow the EB program to trigger on and off in a more timely fashion. These triggers outperform all previously legislated triggers as well as other commonly proposed triggering mechanisms on criteria of timeliness, breadth, and duration. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables

A central question in the study of democratic polities is the extent to which elite opinion about policy shapes public opinion. Estimating the impact of elites on mass opinion is difficult because of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. This article proposes an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of elite messages on public support for European integration employing changes in political institutions as instrumental variables. We find that more negative elite messages about European integration do indeed decrease public support for Europe. Our analysis suggests that OLS estimates are biased, underestimating the magnitude of the effect of elite messages by 50%. We also find no evidence that this effect varies for more politically aware individuals, and our estimates are inconsistent with a mainstreaming effect in which political awareness increases support for Europe in those settings in which elites have a favorable consensus on the benefits of integration.     

Analysing Reform: The House of Commons, 2001–5

This article examines the nature and implications of reforms to the House of Commons that were implemented during the 2001–5 Parliament under the guise of 'modernisation'. It describes the reforms that were implemented during this period in order to enhance the House of Commons' scrutiny capacity over the executive and attempts to assess the degree to which these reforms represent a shift in the balance of power. In order to ground the analysis and provide a clear conceptualisation of power the article adopts a resource-dependency framework that identifies and traces the transfer and deployment of key resources in order to prevent or facilitate change. The article concludes that the common distinction between 'modernising parliament' and 'parliamentary reform' needs refining and offers an 'incremental-bounded reform' model which provides a framework for not only gauging and understanding the process of reform but also explaining the nature of restraints. This model suggests that scrutiny reforms implemented during 2001–5 should not be dismissed, particularly in the context of the parliamentary decline thesis. A number of significant 'cracks and wedges' have been achieved and these may expand over time through a gradual process of extension, accretion and spillover.     

Who Preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law? Federalism and Political Accountability Under Global Trade Rules

With its "Burma law, " Massachusetts joined a procurement boycottof companies doing business in Burma. In Crosby v. NFTC, theU.S. Supreme Court held that Congress preempted the Massachusettslaw, even though Congress was silent on preemption. The Courtrelied on actions by executive-branch, foreign, and corporateactors to find that the state law was an obstacle to impliedobjectives of federal Burma sanctions. In doing so, the Courtdiffused congressional accountability for preemption and constrainedthe "constituent diplomacy" by which states and local governmentsuse their purchasing power to influence national policy andmultinational corporations. Crosby shifted the burden to Congressto express its intent not to preempt such measures. Congresshas several opportunities to meet this burden if it wants topreserve the diversity and balance that constituent diplomacybrings to the federal system.     

Politics and the New American Welfare States

Federal law allows states to create new welfare policies determining who can receive welfare, what types of clients are exempted from new welfare work requirements, and the value of cash benefits. This project tests nine different theoretical explanations of welfare policy to explain why states have reacted differently to this new authority. We test these explanations on Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) policies promulgated between 1997 and 2000. Our findings confirm the strong role of race in TANF politics that Soss et al. (2001) recently reported, but we also find that other constituent characteristics, and institutions, paternalistic goals, and state resources have a consistent influence on welfare policy. These results indicate that different approaches to welfare are attributable to the unique, and very potent, combination of political characteristics in each state.     

Contract–Management Capacity in Municipal and County Governments

Under pressure to do more with less, governments across the country have moved from direct service provision to providing services by contract. Proponents argue that contracting can reduce costs and improve flexibility and customer satisfaction. Critics point to a growing number of failed contracts, arguing there are numerous pitfalls associated with contracting. Missing from these debates is a discussion of how governments' managerial capacity can improve contract performance. In this article, we identify specific capacities that governments can use to harness the promise of contracting while avoiding its pitfalls. We present analyses of data on municipal and county government contracting activities that show how governments invest in contract– management capacity in response to several internal and external threats to effective contract performance. Because government investment in contract–management capacity is uneven—that is, some governments invest in less capacity even when circumstances would call for more—our analyses may help to explain why some contract arrangements are more successful than others.     

The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital

Democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy. We argue that there are significant indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education. Where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital, we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators. In addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth, we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies. We conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30-year panel of 128 countries. We find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth. Rather, we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in non poor countries.