Functioning and Effectiveness of Electronic Control Devices Such as the TASER® M‐ and X‐Series: A Review of the Current Literature

Abstract: Conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) such as the TASER^® M‐ and X‐series deliver short high‐voltage, low‐current energy pulses to temporarily paralyze a person by causing electrical interruption of the body’s normal energy pulses. Despite many scientific publications, which classify the health risks of an appropriate use of the TASER device as minor, there still is a continuous uncertainty about possible side effects with human application. Based on a literature search of the National Library of Medicine’s MEDLINE database’s PubMed system of current publications, the following article describes the mechanisms by which the device operates and discusses possible pathophysiological consequences. The majority of current human literature has not found evidence of clinical relevant pathophysiological effects during and after an exposure of professionally applied CEWs. However, to be able to exclude possible health risks, a medical checkup of people who have been exposed to CEWs is essential.     

Will the European Commission be able to standardise legal technology design without a legal method?

Privacy by Design (PbD) is a kind of precautionary legal technology design. It takes opportunities for fundamental rights without creating risks for them. Now the EU Commission “promised” to implement PbD with Art. 23(4) of its proposal of a General Data Protection Regulation. It suggests setting up a committee that can define technical standards for PbD. However the Commission did not keep its promise. Should it be left to the IT security experts who sit in the committee but do not have the legal expertise, to decide on our privacy or, by using overly detailed specifications, to prevent businesses from marketing innovative products? This paper asserts that the Commission's implementation of PbD is not acceptable as it stands and makes positive contributions for the work of a future PbD committee so that the Commission can keep its promise to introduce precautionary legal technology design.     

Understanding chester I. Barnard

Chester I. Barnard is an example of a manager-participant-observer whose concepts and theories have a major impact on managerial thought and practice in both the public and private sectors.

I am greatly honored to be here and to participate in the first meeting of the Chester I. Barnard Society (U.S.A.). It seems only fitting that we make every effort to bring Barnard, the man, and Barnard's thinking to public attention. In this modern age where computers and rapidly advancing technology seem to be dominating our world, we need to find focus and balance in dealing with the eternal paradoxes and conflicts of a managerial society. Chester I. Barnard more than any other person in the field of management provides perspective for this challenge.

Accordingly, I wish to discuss my perception of Chester I. Barnard and some of the key concepts found in his philosophy and his theory of management. However, before doing so I wish to summarize comments about Chester I. Barnard by a few outstanding persons. These will serve to give a feel for the breadth of Barnard's activities and the significance of his work.

Barnard's thinking has been praised by outstanding men of science. Many see in the work of Herbert Simon, the Nobel Prize recipient, a significant shadow of Barnard. In Simon's book, Administrative Behavior, a number of ideas are traceable to Barnard: composite decision processes, bounded rationality, opportunism in decision processes, and so forth. Simon himself states that “The Functions of the Executive [Barnard's major publication]⁽¹⁾ was a major influence upon my thinking about administration.⁽²⁾ The eminent economist, Kenneth Boulding, states in his book, The Image, that one of the books which influenced him the most is the “pioneering work of Chester I. Barnard.”⁽³⁾

The famous American philosopher, John Dewey, stated: “In the main I believe the great value of Barnard's discussion is that it is one of those rare cases in which a man of affairs, an experienced executive, also has genuine intellectual curiosity and wisdom.”⁽⁴⁾

Bertrand de Jeuvenel, the distinguished French political scientist, wrote to Barnard: “Your thinking is political philosophy of the highest order...As one speaks of Keynesian revolution in economics, I feel one should speak of a Barnardian revolution in political science.”⁽⁵⁾

Fortune Magazine,one of the renown American business periodicals, states:

Chester I. Barnard possibly possesses the most capacious intellect of any business executive in the U.S.⁽⁶⁾     

Developing countries' terms of trade in manufactures, 1967–87: A note

Terms of trade, relating only to manufactured exports and imports, are calculated for a sample of 37 industrialised and developing countries over the 1967 to 1987 period. It is found that the terms of trade movements were significantly more favourable for higher‐income countries. This result highlights the importance of export diversification as part of a development strategy.     

The Euro and the European Demos: Money and Community beyond the Nation-state

Money represents a form of trust among the members of a community. They share a belief that certain symbolic tokens constitute real value. Sceptics frequently point out that the euro area does not have the characteristics of a community. In particular they view the euro as money without a demos. According to this sceptical view, then, the euro is backed by an insufficient level of solidarity and suffers from a deficit of legitimacy. This article identifies the main flaws and contradictions of the no-demos theory. Most importantly, no-demos theory suffers from the fundamental misconception that political community and democracy are possible only in the nation-state. This conceptualisation of community represents a zero-sum understanding of community that cannot capture the dynamic interaction of multiple communities as well as complex and overlapping identities. In addition, no-demos theory is trapped in an internal contradiction. In order for democracy to be possible among the members of a community, that membership in the community is given and rests on pre-democratic criteria. I argue in this article that we need to accept the notion of disaggregated communities and should drop the concept of a unified and fully sovereign demos altogether. Moreover, under conditions in which the gap between sovereignty and authority continues to grow, European Monetary Union is actually a more democratic form of governance than the pre-Maastricht monetary regime in Europe.