The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial,Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints

Many scholars and policymakers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare—a first step toward the robotics age—will promote instability and conflict at the international level. This view depends on the widely shared assumption among International Relations scholars that military hardware spreads easily, especially in the age of globalization and real-time communications. In this article, we question this consensus. Drawing from the literature in management, we advance a new theory of diffusion of military innovations and test its two underlying causal mechanisms. First, we argue that designing, developing, and manufacturing advanced weapon systems require laboratories, and testing and production facilities, as well as know-how and experience that cannot be easily borrowed from other fields. Second, we argue that the adoption of military innovations requires both organizational and infrastructural support. We test our two claims on three types of combat-effective drones: loitering attack munitions (LAMs), intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance drones (ISR), and unmanned combat autonomous vehicles (UCAVs). We find that even wealthy, advanced, and militarily capable countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France have struggled to produce or adopt such platforms. We conclude that concerns about the diffusion of drone warfare appear significantly exaggerated, as do claims that globalization redistributes military power at the global level. More generally, our analysis sheds light on how the interaction between platform and adoption challenges affects the rate and speed of diffusion of different military innovations.     

Development of multiplex PCRs for evolutionary and forensic applications of 37 human Y chromosome SNPs

This work describes an efficient and rapid test for typing 37 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) of the non-recombining region of Y chromosome (NRY) from a minimal amount of DNA using six PCR multiplexes. Markers were drawn following a hierarchical strategy based on the phylogenetic tree of Y chromosome proposed by the Y Chromosome Consortium [The Y Chromosome Consortium, A nomenclature system for the tree of human Y-chromosomal binary haplogroups, Genome Res. 12 (2002) 339-348]. Two multiplexes--arbitrarily named MY1 and MY2--were developed to explore the basal branches of the tree encompassing all the major clades A-R: MY1 for markers M35, M89, M172, M170, M9, M173, M45 and MY2 for markers M52, M216, M174, M181, M201, M91, M96, M214. Four multiplexes able of typing the more superficial branches typical of most frequent European haplogroups E3b, J2, R1 and I, were also developed and named MY-E3b (M78, M107, M224, M165, M148, M81), MY-J2 (M158, M68, M47, M102, M137, M67), MY-R1 (M17, M269, M18, P25, SRY10831.2) and MY-I (M72, M223, M26, M21, M161). SNP genotyping was carried out by hot-start PCR amplification with primers yielding fragments between 63 and 210 nucleotides, followed by minisequencing reaction based on dideoxy single-base extension and capillary electrophoresis of extension products. The sequential application of these multiplexes is a robust and effective resource for typing the most frequent European Y-SNP haplogroups, and appears to be suitable for forensic purposes and evolutionary studies.     

Another ‘special relationship’: The British‐Swiss early cold war coordination of defence (1947–53)

Switzerland's participation in the highly political Marshall Plan was considered the utmost commitment the West could expect from this neutral country during the unfolding Cold War. In military matters, though, the national doctrine seemed to be applied most rigidly. Indeed, the Swiss refrained from establishing substantial contacts with their direct neighbours as well as with the chief sponsors of European security. Neutrality, however, did not prevent the Swiss from entertaining uniquely British‐oriented military relations, that culminated during the Korean war in a high degree of coordination of defence, wherein Field‐Marshal Montgomery played a crucial mediatory role.     

From Notary to Ruler: The Role of the President of the Republic during the Italian Crisis (2010–14)

During the period of political and economic crisis in Italy, the President of the Republic became the central institutional actor of the Italian parliamentary government. This led to a debate among party politicians and scholars of Italian politics concerning the role of the Head of State in Italian democracy. Focusing on the period from 2010 until the beginning of 2014, the article explains the growing power of the President by examining the conditions that allowed presidential powers to increase. It concludes by discussing the potential effects of the increase in presidential powers on the evolution of Italian parliamentary government.     

Another 'special relationship': The British-Swiss early cold war coordination of defence (1947-53)

Switzerland's participation in the highly political Marshall Plan was considered the utmost commitment the West could expect from this neutral country during the unfolding Cold War. In military matters, though, the national doctrine seemed to be applied most rigidly. Indeed, the Swiss refrained from establishing substantial contacts with their direct neighbours as well as with the chief sponsors of European security. Neutrality, however, did not prevent the Swiss from entertaining uniquely British-oriented military relations, that culminated during the Korean war in a high degree of coordination of defence, wherein Field-Marshal Montgomery played a crucial mediatory role.