Common Foreign and Security Policy Alignment in the Southern Caucasus: Convergence, ‘Pick and Choose’ or Indifference?

This article examines the issue of Common Foreign and Security Policy alignment—a procedure by which governments from the European Union's neighbourhood may support previously adopted Common Foreign and Security Policy documents. It provides a comparative theory test of Common Foreign and Security Policy alignment in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In doing so it seeks to elucidate why they engage in alignment as well as how cross-country and cross-issue variance can be theorised. After reviewing the explanatory potential of power-based and sociological institutionalist theory, domestic variables are assessed. The essay shows that, contrary to frequently expressed assumptions, convergence is even possible in less institutionalised high politics fields. But it emphasises that it is largely conditioned by domestic institutional configurations, the preferences of individual or collective actors and overall state gains.     

Election Laws,Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform

State governments have experimented with a variety of election laws to make voting more convenient and increase turnout. The impacts of these reforms vary in surprising ways, providing insight into the mechanisms by which states can encourage or reduce turnout. Our theory focuses on mobilization and distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of election laws. We conduct both aggregate and individual‐level statistical analyses of voter turnout in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. The results show that Election Day registration has a consistently positive effect on turnout, whereas the most popular reform—early voting—is actually associated with lower turnout when it is implemented by itself. We propose that early voting has created negative unanticipated consequences by reducing the civic significance of elections for individuals and altering the incentives for political campaigns to invest in mobilization.     

Alternative routes to teaching: The impacts of Teach for America on student achievement and other outcomes

This paper reports on a randomized experiment to study the impact of an alternative teacher preparation program, Teach for America (TFA), on student achievement and other outcomes. We found that TFA teachers had a positive impact on math achievement and no impact on reading achievement. The size of the impact on math scores was about 15 percent of a standard deviation, equivalent to about one month of instruction. The general conclusions did not differ substantially for subgroups of teachers, including novice teachers, or for subgroups of students. We found no impacts on other student outcomes such as attendance, promotion, or disciplinary incidents, but TFA teachers were more likely to report problems with student behavior than were their peers. The findings contradict claims that such programs allowing teachers to bypass the traditional route to the classroom harm students. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Crises of Confidence: Attitudes of the Domestic Bankers Towards the Credit Problem in Mexico

This paper analyses the Mexican banks' loan policies since 1995. Based on a series of interviews, we find that Mexico's financial system is currently experiencing two crises. First, banks lack confidence in the business practices of small and medium size enterprises. This negative attitude is reinforced by the bankers' perception of a culture of non-repayment. Banks also loan little to big businesses, which rely on the international money market. Second, bankers believe small and medium size business owners lack confidence in the Mexican financial system. Consequently, loan activities are down significantly. Socio-economic growth and development in Mexico will depend upon a profound change in structures, practices and attitudes surrounding loan activities.     

Domestic politics and the strategy of international trade

The policymaking problem in international trade is fundamentally strategic, since optimal national policy depends on what other nations choose to do. The game is not between unitary rational actors, however, but rather between players with considerable internal divisions about what policy should be. There is a rich domestic politics to international trade policymaking. Conventional wisdom holds that internal division is a liability in international interactions. This article demonstrates that if countries are divided internally between divergent interests, this will alter the outcome of strategic games between countries in, for example, setting tariffs. In particular, internal division can actually be helpful to a country, since a protectionist faction helps to make a protectionist threat more credible.