Restoring accountability in pretrial release: the Philadelphia pretrial release supervision experiments

As drug arrests and jail overcrowding added pressure to increase pretrial release in localities during the 1980s and 1990s, the need to manage a larger and higher-risk pretrial population of defendants awaiting adjudication in the community became a high priority for justice agencies. In the late 1990s Philadelphia officials sought to discover the ingredients of a successful supervision strategy through four interlinked field experiments to provide an empirical basis for a major reform of the pretrial release system. The results of the linked randomized experiments question common assumptions about “supervision,” its impact and effectiveness, about the underlying nature of the noncompliant defendant, and deterrence implications. The study emphasizes the importance of interpreting the findings in the context of implementation of the policy reform. Findings suggest that facilitative notification strategies wield little influence on defendant behavior and that deterrent aims are undermined by the system's failure to deliver consequences for defendant noncompliance during pretrial release. The most significant contribution of the article is its illustration of a major evidence-based policy reform undertaken by a major court system.     

THE FUTURE OF PORTUGUESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND A NEW AGENDA FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SCIENCES IN THE 21st CENTURY

This paper addresses the changing role of the Portuguese state, the present priority assigned to the process of reform and the new challenges to be overcome by public administration. Such processes are demanding a new agenda for education and research in public administration sciences, shifting from the public law paradigm to an interdisciplinary problem‐solving approach and giving special attention to 10 key areas of study, which we describe in the final section of the paper. It should be noted here that the opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of their institutions.     

Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility

This paper reviews China's recent efforts to enact a competitionpolicy (antitrust) law. We focus on three issues: (1) What isthe substance of the proposed law, and how does it differ fromexisting antitrust law in other countries, (2) How will thelaw be implemented or enforced, and how will those who mustimplement this law interpret their mandate, and (3) What willbe the likely effects of this law given China's unique historyand cultural heritage. We emphasize China's economic, legaland regulatory contexts in which an antitrust law may be enforced.Our central focus is the problem of establishing a substantiveand procedural legal framework that is incentive-compatiblewith economic efficiency and growth. The draft law could beimproved, both to increase its clarity and to make its enforcementmore consistent with the goal of achieving improvements in economicefficiency. Nevertheless, there is much merit in the draft,especially its strong focus on reducing anticompetitive practicesof state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other government bodies.However, our major difficulty with the new law is that, in theabsence of a tradition of reliance on the rule of law, Chineseand foreign enterprises will find it very difficult to relyon the antitrust statute or the actions of the courts in Chinaas a basis for predicting the antitrust liability that mightresult from various business practices. Therefore, the principalvector by which antitrust law (or indeed any law) affects economicbehavior is absent from the Chinese scene. Unless the bureaucracythat enforces the new antitrust law actively pursues a policyof consistent enforcement based on written guidelines, staredecisis, or other sources of predictability, the substance ofthe statute itself will have little significance. That outcomewould represent a significant loss for the economic welfareof the Chinese people.     

Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust

Modern antitrust policy has a ‘love hate’ relationshipwith non-standard contracts that can overcome market failure.On the one hand, courts have abandoned various per se rulesthat once condemned such agreements outright, concluding thatmany non-standard contracts may produce benefits that are cognizableunder the antitrust laws.¹ The prospect of such benefits, itis said, compels courts to analyze these agreements under theRule of Reason, under which the tribunal determines whethera given restraint enhances or destroys competition.² At thesame time, courts, scholars, and the enforcement agencies haveembraced methods of rule of reason analysis that are undulyhostile to such agreements.³ In particular, courts and othersare too quick to view such agreements and the market outcomesthey produce as manifestations of market power. This articleseeks to explain why these agreements are still the object ofundue hostility.     

Assessing Market Power: The Trade-off Between Market Concentration and Multi-Market Participation

This analysis reveals that traditional market power measuresare biased under the conditions of multi-market participationand demand interdependence. Specifically, when complementary(substitutable) demands dominate, traditional market power measuresare biased upward (downward). A similar bias carries over tothe evaluation of mergers. To wit, mergers that simultaneouslyincrease market concentration and multi-market participationcan result in lower prices even in the absence of merger economies.It follows that merger guidelines that place undue emphasison market concentration can lead policymakers to block (approve)mergers that enhance (diminish) consumer welfare.     

NETWORK REGULATION: THE MANY FACES OF ACCESS

Telecommunications regulation has experienced a fundamentalshift from rate regulation to increased reliance on compelledaccess, perhaps best exemplified by the Telecommunications Actof 1996's imposition of no fewer than four new access requirements.Unfortunately, each access requirement is governed by a separateset of rules for determining both the scope and the price ofaccess. The resulting ad hoc regime has created difficult definitionalproblems and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In thisarticle we propose a system inspired by the discipline of mathematicsknown as graph theory that integrates all of the different formsof access into a single analytical framework. This system separatesdifferent access regimes into five categories: (1) retail access,(2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access, (4) platformaccess, and (5) unbundled access. It also provides insightsinto how each type of access complicates the already difficultproblems of network configuration and management and introducesinefficient biases into decisions about network capacity anddesign. The approach we propose also provides insights intothe transaction cost implications of the different types ofaccess. Drawing on the Coasean theory of the firm, our approachexamines the tradeoffs between internal governance costs andthe external transaction costs of providing access to offera theory of network boundaries. This framework shows how accessregulation distorts networks' natural boundaries and providesa basis for evaluating whether private ordering through marketswould lead to more efficient network design.     

DOES ECONOMICS PROVIDE A RELIABLE GUIDE TO REGULATING COMMODITY BUNDLING BY FIRMS? A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE

This article surveys the voluminous economic literature on commoditybundling. While bundling has been widely studied, the vast majorityof the literature has focused on theoretical treatments of bundlingthat demonstrate a wide range of reasons why firms might engagein bundling. These papers generally contain restrictive assumptions,including assumptions regarding the existence of monopoly insome markets, and the nature of rivalry in others. The modelscontained in these papers also generally suppress the more obviousand ubiquitous reasons firms may use bundling. Moreover, thesemodels have not been subject to robustness checks, nor havetheir assumptions been tested empirically. This review of theeconomic literature generally confirms the US Solicitor General'sview in 3M v. LePage's regarding the underdeveloped state ofthe economics literature and its position that the US SupremeCourt should defer promulgation of antitrust standards for bundling.While the literature has demonstrated the possibility that bundlingcan generate anticompetitive harm, it does not provide a reliableway to gauge whether the potential for harm would outweigh anydemonstrable benefits from the practice. As a result, the widespreadapplication of the antitrust laws to bundling by firms can generatesignificant error costs by erroneously condemning or deterringefficient business practices. In the future, economists shouldseek to expand their understanding of both the anticompetitiveand procompetitive reasons firms engage in bundling. This willentail studying the reasons why bundling is adopted by firmswithout market power, relaxing the assumption of monopoly intheoretical models, and generating testable hypotheses and thedata to test them.