<Emphasis Type="Italic">Sheldon S. Wolin:</Emphasis> Tocqueville between two worlds: The making of a political and theoretical life

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Sheldon S. Wolin: Tocqueville between two worlds: The making of a political and theoretical life Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press 2001, 650 S., $ 24,95

     

Selbstentfesselung in kleinen Schritten? Deutschlands Außenpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts

Ohne Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag wurde bereits Anfang Januar 2003 abgeschlossen und konnte bis Mitte Februar nur noch geringfügig erg?nzt werden. Der Verfasser ist Herrn Fariborz Zelli, M.A., für seine Mithilfe bei der Vorbereitung dieses Essays zu gro?em Dank verpflichtet.     

A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game‐theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task. Importantly, agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal's, and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels. Among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents'. But redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal's. In this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent. Redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent's jurisdiction can be terminated.     

In the Wake of 'A Certain Maritime Incident': Ministerial Advisers, Departments and Accountability

This article considers the accountability of ministerial advisers and their relationship with departments in the light of 'the children overboard' incident. It argues that if ministers are not going to accept responsibility for the actions of their advisers then on those occasions the advisers should be separately accountable to the parliament. The article further suggests that the department heads have a particular responsibility for ensuring the integrity of ministerial advice, and proposes steps to reinforce their capacity to fulfil that responsibility.