Excepted substances: a comparison of Federal and state laws.

A state law has placed an obligation on the criminal investigation laboratories to screen and quantitate all preparations, both pharmaceutical and illicit, that fall under the provisions of "Excepted Substances." Without complete screens on these preparations, there is room for erroneous indictments as well as possible acquittals on technicalities.     

Identity Style,Parental Authority,and Identity Commitment

The role that parental authority patterns and social-cognitive identity styles may play in establishing identity commitments was investigated. The results indicated that family authority and identity style variables combined accounted for 50% of the variation in strength of identity commitment. As hypothesized, the relationship between parental authority and identity commitment was mediated by identity style. The findings are consistent with the view that family authority patterns may contribute to the way in which late adolescents negotiate the task of constructing a sense of identity. Alternative explanations of the findings are considered.     

Enduring Tensions in the 2000 Defence White Paper

In 2000 the Howard government formed a consultative committee to review defence policy and gauge public opinion on defence issues. It concentrated on the impact of budgetary stringency and dramatic strategic change and supported increased defence spending on equipment to cater for high‐level threats. Was there a thorough review? Inconsistencies occurred in the reports developed from the review and statements made by senior policy‐makers while it was being conducted. The way the review was undertaken points to conceptual tensions in Australia's strategic culture and serious problems with entrenched interests in the services. Unless these challenges are addressed, a thorough review of defence policy cannot be undertaken. The review process itself needs to be reviewed.     

A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game‐theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task. Importantly, agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal's, and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels. Among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents'. But redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal's. In this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent. Redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent's jurisdiction can be terminated.     

In the Wake of 'A Certain Maritime Incident': Ministerial Advisers, Departments and Accountability

This article considers the accountability of ministerial advisers and their relationship with departments in the light of 'the children overboard' incident. It argues that if ministers are not going to accept responsibility for the actions of their advisers then on those occasions the advisers should be separately accountable to the parliament. The article further suggests that the department heads have a particular responsibility for ensuring the integrity of ministerial advice, and proposes steps to reinforce their capacity to fulfil that responsibility.     

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement.