Nourishing men's anger and inflaming the fires of hatred: Bayle on religious violence and the ‘Novus Ordo Saeclorum’

In 1697, the Huguenot writer Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) published his Dictionnaire historique et critique ‐ a one‐man encyclopaedia. The article entitled Macon drew attention to the cruel atrocities perpetrated during the French Wars of Religion. This article explains the context of Bayle's critique, arguing that he uses the example to reflect on the Gallican regime's renewal of persecution against his community, and on the notorious revocation by Louis XIV, in 1685, of the Edict of Nantes. As a long‐term remedy for state violence against a law‐abiding minority, he recommends deliberative freedom within a framework of government impartiality, thereby anticipating a new secular order. A new translation of Bayle's article Macon can be found in the appendix.     

Der sogenannte Auffüllungsanspruch bei der Mietkaution – insbesondere in der Insolvenz

In einem rezenten Judikat hatte sich der OGH mit einer zentralen Frage zur Mietkaution zu befassen. Entscheidungswesentlich war, ob und aus welchem Rechtsgrund der Bestandgaber im Fall von Mietzinsrückständen die Wiederauffüllung der vom Bestandnehmer bestellten Kaution auf den ursprünglichen erlegten Betrag verlangen kann. Zu prüfen war dabei auch die Behandlung dieses Anspruchs in der Insolvenz des Bestandnehmers. Der Beitrag stellt die wesentlichen Aussagen der Entscheidung vor, analysiert ihre Konsequenzen kritisch und zieht Schlussfolgerungen für die Praxis.     

Should the Law Convict Those Who Act from Conviction? Reflections on a Demands-of-Conscience Criminal Defense

How should the judge or jury in a just criminal court treat a civil disobedient, someone who performs a conscientiously motivated communicative breach of the criminal law? Kimberley Brownlee contends that all else equal a court of law should neither convict nor punish such offenders. Though I agree with this conclusion, I contend that Brownlee mischaracterizes the nature of the criminal defense to which civil disobedients are entitled. Whereas Brownlee maintains that such actors ought to be excused for their criminal breach, I argue that they ought to enjoy a justification defense. Acts of civil disobedience are not (morally) wrongful violations of the law for which an actor ought not to be blamed; rather, they are violations of the law that are not (morally) wrong in virtue of their illegality. It is the absence of wrongdoing, and not merely the absence of fault, that renders the conviction and punishment of those who perform acts of civil disobedience inappropriate.