Criticizing the image of the student as consumer: examining legal trends and administrative responses in the US and UK1

There is widespread concern that higher education is being compromised by being turned into a ‘commodity’ to be ‘consumed’. This article represents an initial attempt to explore the trends in both the UK and US, and considers how the law has responded to them. It argues, however, that there is an important distinction to be drawn between ‘commodification’ and ‘consumerism’. Education has always been a commodity to be bought and sold; the true danger lies in the move to a ‘rights-based’ culture where students (and politicians) see education merely as something to be ‘consumed’ rather than as an activity in which to participate. Whilst the law seems thus far to have been something of a bulwark against this movement, it remains an open question as to whether this will continue to be the case if HEIs do not themselves act more proactively in challenging this damaging view of higher education.     

RICO: The genesis of an idea

In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. This Act had its origins in legislation going back as far as 1934, but coming forward to 1961. The 1970 Act borrowed ideas from this earlier legislation, principally “enterprise,” but also the use predicate statutes to define “racketeering activity.” The ideas are not new, but their combination affects how prosecutors and law enforcement agents investigate, try, and sanction violations of the Act. RICO’s drafting also reflects organizational theory and economic analysis. The investigation and prosecution of a single crime committed by an individual on a single day and in a single place maybe done using one set of procedural and evidentiary rules. Nevertheless, the investigation and prosecution of patterns of diverse offenses committed by, through, and against licit and illicit enterprises require sophisticated procedures, evidentiary rules, and criminal sanctions. In addition, antisocial conduct is more than a challenge to the administration of criminal justice; it also requires the full panoply of civil sanctions, including public injunctions as well private enforcement of injunctive relief and treble damages. RICO has had a profound effect on the prosecution of organized crime, white-collar crime, and other forms of similar criminal behavior. William J. & Dorothy K. O’Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre Dame Law School. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) was processed, Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. For a general treatment of the statute from a variety of perceptive, see the collection of law review literature in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin Roddy, “Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning an Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO,” 33 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 n. 3(1996).     

Reforming Chinese arbitration law and practices in the global economy

In the last 50 years Chinese arbitration law and practices has made significant contributions to the international commercial arbitration and strides to manage the rapidly increasing caseload associated with a period of amazing growth in economic interactions between Chinese and non-Chinese parties. In the global economy there are rooms for further improvement. The paper proposed some ideas on reforming the Chinese arbitration law and practices on the arbitration system regarding the ad hoc arbitration, panel system and tribunal jurisdiction, interim measures of protection, as well as standards for the judicial review on the arbitral awards.     

To Wonderland Through the Looking-glass: Conceiving a Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African Law of Contract †

The aim of this paper is to identify the possible substructure (looking glass/es) of a critical legal argument for contractual justice (Wonderland) in the South African law of contract. South African contract law still fails, ten years after the constitutional transformation, to reflect the constitutional ideals of freedom, equality and human dignity in an acceptable manner. I argue that this disposition places a question mark over the legitimacy of contract law and marginalizes opportunities for the social change envisaged by the Constitution. The paper explores Duncan Kennedy’s Form and Substance-argument and indicates that the reluctance to accommodate these values may be attributable to the fact that the majority of role-players position themselves on the individualism/rules side of Kennedy’s continuum – a paradigm that perceives the law of contract as a body of positivistic rules to be applied neutrally and regardless of the social or socio-economic distortions its application may generate. In an attempt to move away from this traditional approach, the privileged paradigm is criticised. A typical CLS-approach is followed which employs sociology, psychological jurisprudence and game theory to criticise the law from outside the restrictive realms of law itself. Simultaneously, I attempt to illuminate the argument for a shift (step through the looking glass) to another paradigm. I conclude that our judiciary finds itself in a position similar to that of Plato’s prisoners in the cave and will not reach the point where they apply relevant (constitutional) values directly to contractual disputes. The State is thus responsible for infusing contract law with contractual justice, by implementing legislation to this effect in order to limit the hegemonic consequences of the judiciary’s obsession with freedom of contract and utopian rules, which fail in reality to further the ideal of justice. Paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, 4 September 2004, London, UK. This paper is dedicated to the memory of the late Judge of Appeal, Mr. Justice P.J. Olivier. The paper is based on research conducted for the thesis in partial fulfilment of the degree LLD in the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria under the title ‘A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South African law of contract.’ The degree supervisor is Professor Karin van Marle in the Department of Legal History, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence. The author wishes to thank the following persons for valuable deliberations and input: Karin van Marle, Graham Bradfield and Anashri Pillay. In addition, the author wishes to acknowledge and thank the University of Cape Town for financially supporting this research. †Paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, 4 September 2004, London, UK. This paper is dedicated to the memory of the late Judge of Appeal, Mr. Justice P.J. Olivier. The paper is based on research conducted for the thesis in partial fulfilment of the degree LLD in the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria under the title ‘A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South African law of contract.’ The degree supervisor is Professor Karin van Marle in the Department of Legal History, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence. The author wishes to thank the following persons for valuable deliberations and input: Karin van Marle, Graham Bradfield and Anashri Pillay. In addition, the author wishes to acknowledge and thank the University of Cape Town for financially supporting this research. apply relevant (constitutional) values directly to contractual disputes. The State is thus responsible for infusing contract law with contractual justice, by implementing legislation to this effect in order to limit the hegemonic consequences of the judiciary’s obsession with freedom of contract and utopian rules, which fail in reality to further the ideal of justice.