Precedence,privilege, preferences,plus Pareto principle: Some examples on egalitarian ethics and economic efficiency

It is demonstrated how economic theory of justice as fairness, Pareto improvements on situations involving equity, can be used to analyze the ethics contents of distributions of rights and privileges. The analysis makes use of the concept of a veil of ignorance to define a status quo. A property right to an ability or a privilege is interpreted as a transparency in the veil in respect to this ability or privilege. Three different examples are investigated, focusing on rights as collective goods, non-transferable abilities, and privileges as inherent rights.Revised version of Presidential address to the annual meeting of the European Public-Choice Society in Linz, Austria, 29 March to 1 April, 1989. I thank Johann K. Brunner, Josef Falkinger, and Björn Sandvik for many helpful comments.     

A POLICY OF OUR OWN: LOCAL FEMINIST NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SERVICES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN

This article examines the ways in which a feminist family policy agenda has led to significant political action and change within American cities. Feminist groups, during the past fifteen years, became a part of emerging local women's rights policy networks that effected changes in several services for women and children: libraries (programming for women and non-sexist children's literature acquisitions policies); public education (gender equit under Title IX); social welfare (child care and displaced homemaker services); and criminal justice and health (the treatment of the victims of rape and domestic violence). This policy success stems not only from the workings of traditional interest group politics and policy networks but also from the astute use of political symbols, bureaucratic norms, and the federal system.     

The state of nature in the shadow of contract formation: Adding a missing link to J.M. Buchanan's social contract theory

The social contract theory of J.M. Buchanan provides no clear-cut answer on the question which one of the multitude of possible Pareto-efficient contracts is chosen by individuals who shape a contract in an (imaginary) state of nature. This deficiency is remedied in this paper by adding the Nash-bargaining theory. It seems to be in line with at least part of Buchanan's reasoning. Whereas for Buchanan the configuration of contract depends unilaterally on the natural equilibrium of the state of nature, we are able to show that the parties' (rational) contractual expectations have repercussions for their behavior in the state of nature. That is why the location of the natural equilibrium proves to be heavily dependent on the chosen bargaining theory. The implication is that assessing the legitimacy of a given constitutional order or contract (on the basis of the natural equilibrium) depends on the particular bargaining theory chosen to solve the underlying constitutional distribution problem. I am grateful to D. Andrews, D. Schmidtchen and U. Witt for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The usual caveat applies.     

The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments

Empirical evidence offered in this study suggests that decisions by state government officials to effect debt-financed spending depend in part on the state's gubernatorial election cycle. More specifically, the results reveal relative increases in state debt issues in anticipation of elections, and furthermore, they reveal that such increases are more significant for states characterized by high interparty political competition. While theoretical limitations preclude a definitive explanation for these results, the evidence is consistent with a view of state political markets where incumbent parties manipulate public policy so as to enhance the probability of success in pending elections. This insight is significant in that it suggests a relationship between public policy decisions and election cycles in a context heretofore unexplored.