Empirical Evidence on Human Trafficking and Migration-Debt Contracts in Bangladesh

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of the payments illegal migrants make to traffickers. It covers the total amounts of these payments, the incidence of migration-debt (or shared) contracts, and the value of the deferred payment component under these shared contracts. Data on illegal migrants from three field surveys conducted in Bangladesh from April 2009 to November 2010 are used. The results show that the total payments made to traffickers vary with easily observed characteristics (gender, age, marital status) but do not vary with details of the migration process (training provided, time spent in the trafficker’s queue). These relationships are consistent with exploitation. Migration-debt contracts are more prevalent when the costs of illegal migration are relatively high, which adds empirical support to theoretical models such as Friebel and Guriev (2006). Contrary to existing reports, we document variations in fees for illegal passage across individuals.     

Reverse Gender Gap in Schooling in Bangladesh: Insights from Urban and Rural Households

This paper documents a reverse gender gap in secondary schooling outcomes in Bangladesh drawing upon several rounds of nationally representative household survey data. In terms of enrolment status and years of schooling completed, boys are found to lag behind girls in the rural as well as in the urban area. Within the urban sample, the gender gap is widest in the non-metropolitan area. These findings are robust to extensive control for demand and supply-side determinants of schooling and remain unchanged even when we use a within household estimator. We consider one hypothesis, namely gender-differentiated response to a conditional cash transfer program to reconcile the findings of this reverse gender gap.     

Pakistan's informal sector

This study reviews the main features of Pakistan's informal sector. The data on the informal sector, compiled from censuses and sample surveys in one major city (Rawalpindi), suggest that both real wages and employment have grown in the informal sector. The seeming paradox of real wage growth in a labor surplus economy is explained by real wage growth in both agriculture and large‐scale manufacturing, both of which were made possible by Pakistan's growth performance during the 1960s. The differences in wages between the formal and informal sector, after adjusting for age and education, are quite small, a reflection of high labor mobility between the two sectors.     

Computer Usage and Labour Regulation in India's Retail Sector

Abstract

A recent survey of 1,948 retail stores in India conducted by the World Bank's Enterprise surveys shows that 19 per cent of all stores use computers. In the state of Kerala, the figure is as high as 40 per cent. Using this survey, we estimate the effect of computer usage on labour employment. Our findings show that this effect depends on the stringency of the underlying labour laws. Stricter labour laws magnify the labour displacing effect of computers significantly.     

Population Pressure,Horizontal Inequality and Political Violence: A Disaggregated Study of Indonesian Provinces, 1990–2003

All parts of a country are rarely equally affected by political violence. Yet statistical studies largely fail to address sub-national conflict dynamics. We address this gap studying variations in ‘routine’ and ‘episodic’ violence between Indonesian provinces from 1990 to 2003. Within a grievance framework, the article focuses on the violence potential of resource scarcity and population pressure, as well as inter-group dynamics related to polarisation and horizontal inequality. Demographic pressure and inequality seem to have little effect in isolation. However, in provinces where population growth is high, greater levels of inequality between religious groups appear to increase the violence risk.     

Tax Evasion and the Role of the State Actor(s) in Bangladesh

Little attention has been paid to tax evasion in developing countries due to a lack of data. This article addresses this lacuna by investigating the tax evasion practices and finds significant increases in tax evasion in Bangladesh. The study makes a major contribution to the literature in tax evasion, and indicates that the norms of state actor(s) (i.e. the National Board of Revenue–the sole tax authority in Bangladesh) lie in the interests of politicians and the continuation of corruption. The legitimacy of the state actors in this case means that they act as facilitators for increasing tax evasion practices. Therefore, the current system has endured remarkably robustly to date, and coercive isomorphism is indeed needed in the institutionalization process.