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Molly McQuade 《耶鲁评论》2001,89(3):160-164
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Feminist Legal Studies - 相似文献
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Elizabeth Maggie Penn John W. Patty Sean Gailmard 《American journal of political science》2011,55(2):436-449
This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single‐peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space. We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy‐proof must be dictatorial. Thus, any nondictatorial institutional environment that does not explicitly utilize an a priori ordering over alternatives in order to render a collective decision is necessarily prone to the strategic misrepresentation of preferences by an individual or a group. Moreover, we prove in this environment that for any nondictatorial institution, the truthful revelation of preferences can never be a dominant strategy equilibrium. Accordingly, an incentive to behave insincerely is inherent to the vast majority of real‐world lawmaking systems, even when the policy space is unidimensional and the core is nonempty. 相似文献
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John W. Patty Constanza F. Schibber Elizabeth Maggie Penn Brian F. Crisp 《American journal of political science》2019,63(3):563-576
To the degree that voters care about competence, expertise, and other valence characteristics of their representatives and political parties care about winning elections, parties have an incentive to signal that their legislators have such characteristics. We construct a model of parties, motivated by both reelection and by policy, that attempt to signal individual incumbents' valences to voters through the assignment of these members to positions of authority. The model illustrates how electorally motivated party leaders will have an incentive to promote less competent incumbents than they would if voters did not make inferences from promotion decisions. We derive the model's empirical implications and test them with original data on the careers of Chilean senators serving between 1998 and 2013. In support of the model's insights, we find that promotion to a leadership position is an effective signal to voters only if the promoted incumbent has extreme views relative to the party. 相似文献
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Journal of Family Violence - This study explored the COVID-19 pandemic’s impacts on domestic violence (DV) with the following research questions: 1) Did DV occurring during the pandemic... 相似文献