From contention to social bargaining: labour unions and democratic consolidation in Spain

The main objective of this article is to examine how the links between trade unions and affiliated political parties of the left influenced the strategies of labour during the transition and the early years of democracy in Spain. It argues that political partisanship is a key factor for understanding the unions' strategies. After a period of intense labour conflict during the transition to democracy, labour mobilization decreased and Spain's unions and other social actors initiated distinctive processes of social bargaining, starting in 1979. The central argument is that the relationship of unions and political parties in the authoritarian and transition periods was a major factor in conditioning strategies in the post-authoritarian period. In the end, the consolidation of Spanish democracy has led to the strengthening of the main trade unions. Contrary to what happened in other historical periods they used this power to contribute to governability and the consolidation of the new democratic regime.     

Book reviews

Privatisation and Liberalisation in the Middle East edited by Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992. Pp.vi + 242; index. £30 (hardback); £12.99 (paperback). ISBN 0 253 32697 4 and 0 253 20748 7

Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West edited by David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993. Pp.412; index. £45 (hardback); £14.95 (paperback). ISBN 0 7456 0988 0 and 0 7456 0989 9

The Road to Post‐Communism, Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985–1991 by Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves and Peter F.S. Duncan. London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1992. Pp.x + 236; bibliography; index. £37.50 (hardback); £12.99 (paperback). ISBN 1 85567 080 1 and 1 85567 081 X     

Democratically consolidated,externally threatened,and NATO aligned: finding unexpected deficiencies in civilian control

It has long been presumed in the literature that consolidated democracies that face serious external threats or are NATO-aligned should feature strong, civilian control institutions and personnel. This study of Israel, India, Taiwan, Spain and Poland reveals otherwise. Utilizing biographical data compiled by the authors, we researched civilian personnel within each country’s defence ministry – the organizational hub of civil-military relations. Rather than finding evidence of strong civilian control, what we found instead were ministries with serious deficiencies: they did not have effective power; they failed to engage in defence planning or provide strategic guidance to the armed forces; they were led by military personnel and staffed by civilian employees not properly qualified to handle defence affairs. To explain these discrepancies, we argue that long-standing deficits in civilian expertise spur the delegation of ministerial defence positions to more knowledgeable officers. Comparisons are made with benchmark states that have achieved civilian ministerial control.     

Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.     

Interest mobilization in public health and social insurance: Argentina,Colombia, and Mexico in comparative perspective

One revealing test for gauging the extent to which pluralist democracy has advanced in the recently (re)democratized countries of Latin America is to determine the extent to which interest groups have come to participate in policy making in formal, open, extensive, and accepted ways as they mostly do in advanced liberal democracies. In other words, is this a new era or more of the same? To provide insights into this question, using six hypotheses, this article compares social insurance reform in Argentina and Mexico, and public health reform in Colombia. It appears that the political processes through which the reforms were adopted were fairly democratic, although aspects of the old regimes in all three countries, particularly corporatist relationships, were indispensable backups. The weaknesses that were apparent, however, stem less from the old ways of doing political business and more from the immaturity of the democratic process. Plus, pressures were felt by the executive branches and their allies to show to the international community that their country was a safe place in which to invest. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Chilean big business lobby: a long-standing and major influence on public policy

Elements of the business lobby, particular sectors of big business and its peak associations, have been a continual influence, sometimes a dominant force, in Chilean politics since the second half of the 19th century. This prominence and sustained influence is particularly noteworthy since the 1930s, given the various forms of democracy experienced in Chile, the harsh military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, and because the return to democracy in 1990 has meant increasing competition among interest groups. This article offers an explanation of the political significance of the big business community by reference to both common factors that shape the influence of business across political systems and especially the developments in Chile's political economy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.