Government Growth and Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures

This article analyzes the professionalization of American state legislatures since the 1960s and expands on previous studies by considering the strategic incentives of members. Fiorina and Noll's (1978a, 1978b) theory that reelection‐minded legislators serve as “ombudsmen to the bureaucracy” on behalf of their constituents suggests that legislatures have professionalized in response to growth in public spending in order to strengthen members' abilities to handle increased facilitation duties. I used longitudinal analysis and instrumental variables regression to test this hypothesis and disentangle causal directionality, since professional legislators may have the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts. Both methods revealed empirical support for the Fiorina and Noll hypothesis that spending increases caused legislators to become more professional.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

Spontaneous Order and the Rule of Law: Some Problems

Abstract. Two conservative theorists, F. A. Hayek and Michael Oakeshott, have advanced theories of law with important and plausible central theses focusing on the rule of law. The author argues, however, that in each case the theorist - or at least some of his followers on the contemporary British and American political scene - have wrongly inferred strong conclusions from these theories which are inimical to the welfare state. In conclusion, the author points to possible ways of reconciling rule of law to social justice.     

COUNCILLOR/OFFICER RELATIONS IN IRISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ALTERNATIVE MODELS

The models of Irish local politics that dominate the literature offer inadequate explanations of the elected politiciad officer relationship. This article analyses the behaviour of the most senior local officer (the county or city manager) vis-à-vis elected representatives by first reviewing the relevant parts of four current models and then offering an alternative explanation by way of a fifth 'divergent interest' model. This final model is in part an amalgam of the other four though it also aims to disaggregate the notion of policy as it is currently used. In particular, it seeks to compromise between the neglect of substantive policy concerns inherent in the brokerage explanation and the epiphenomena1 model's ambivalence on the initiatives available to the manager. A feature of this model is that both managers and councillors have policy and administrative interests but in largely non-competitive areas. The divergence of interests between official and politician arises from differing perspectives established by both consideration of time-scale and socialization. The stability of their relationship is reinforced by the temporal fragmentation of the formal policy making process, and b the non-competing resources over which the manager and his councillors seek command: It is hoped that the divergent interests model offered here will be a useful tool in understanding the relationship between Irish politicians and bureaucrats at the local government level.     

The Ethics of Legalism

Abstract. "Legalism" is defined as requiring that all matters of legal regulation and controversy ought so far as possible to be conducted in accordance with predetermined rules of considerable generality and clarity. Thus there may be moral limits on governments which ban them from acting on the substantive moral merits of situations with which they have to deal. This is most important in public law, but also applies in private law, e.g., in cases involving property. Hume, Kant, and Hayek are examined in respect of their case for legalism; Alexy and Finnis also reviewed. Autonomy is the foundation for legalism, and justifies "ethical positivism," in T. Campbell's phrase. Critical legal studies (Unger, Kelman, Kennedy et al.) however challenge legalism's premises. But the "critical" arguments against reification merely raise, they do not settle, the issue about the politics of legalism and the desirability of legal dogmatics. With all faults, legalism is a prerequisite of free government.     

PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS IN THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC SECTOR PROCUREMENT

This article provides a conceptual framework for understanding key psychological barriers to implementing sustainable development in procurement process by local government and health care authorities. This task is an important one as a comprehension of psychological barriers is a prerequisite for understanding how individuals engage with the often more visible technical, budgetary or regulatory barriers in sustainable procurement. The article highlights how progress towards sustainable procurement is hampered by a combination of (1) individual factors; (2) organizational factors; (3) small group adaptation processes; (4) adaptation processes within the organization; and (5) external adaptation processes between organizations. The framework thus contributes to filling the conceptual space between human agent and organizational structure by pointing to the importance of cognitive filters and ideational resources that interact at various levels within an organization and in the complex network of formal or informal partners that surround it.