Use the Purpose by Which All May Benefit: The Semiotics of ‘Public Use’

This paper applies semiotic analysis to issues arising from the recent Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. City of New London [545 U.S.469] (2005). The author uses the tools of semiotics to explore the evolution of language and speech and their relationship to the terms, “private property” and “public use” as used by the Supreme Court and the general public in the years leading up to the Kelo decision. This paper will first provide an overview of the field of semiotics, describing the prevailing thought and the methods utilized by semioticians to find meaning. Second, the tools of semiotics will be applied to Supreme Court cases, beginning with Bauman v. Ross [167 U.S. 548] (1897) and continuing to Kelo v. City of New London. Utilizing these tools, the author will show how, within the span of approximately 100 years, the speech of the court has affected the language of legal discourse. The signs to which both Bauman and Kelo seek to attach meaning are found in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which provides, in relevant part, “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”(emphasis added) (U.S. Const. Amendment 5). This dialectic activity resulted in the development of two different languages. One was used by the layperson, whereas the other was found in relevant legal/political institutions such as the US Supreme Court. This paper will focus on the fundamental change in the meaning of the sign/expression “public use.”     

Portfolio Saliency and Ministerial Turnover: Dynamics in Scandinavian Postwar Cabinets

Why do certain ministers remain in their post for years while others have their time in office cut short? Drawing on the broader literature on portfolio allocation, this article argues that the saliency of individual portfolios shapes ministerial turnover. The main argument is that ministerial dismissals are less likely to occur the higher the saliency attributed to the ministerial portfolio since ministers appointed to important posts are more likely to have been through extensive screening before appointment. Importantly, it is also posited in the article that the effect of portfolio salience is conditioned by government approval ratings: when government ratings are on the decline, prime ministers are less likely to reshuffle or fire important ministers than when approval ratings are improving. To test these claims, Cox proportional hazards models are applied to a new dataset on ministerial turnover in Scandinavia during the postwar period. The results strongly support the proposition that portfolio saliency matters for ministerial survival, and that this effect is moderated by government popularity.     

Combining large-n and small-n strategies: The way forward in coalition research

Current research on coalition formation is plagued by two serious problems. First, we cannot predict more than about one-third of the Western European governments, and, second, we do not have a good understanding of the causal mechanisms that explain the effects found in large-n coalition studies. This article illustrates that by combining statistical and case study analyses we can solve these problems. Since statistical analyses are well equipped for measuring and isolating effects, we argue that a coalition study should start with such an analysis. Predictions made in this analysis are then used to select cases. In order to study the mechanisms underlying effects found in large-n coalition studies, we argue for selecting cases that are predicted, and then applying the method of process verification. In order to find new explanatory variables, we argue for selecting cases that are deviant, and then applying the method of process induction. Substantive results of our analysis for coalition theory point to the importance of party strategies based on parties' past experiences, which aim at curtailing present and future costs of competing and governing with other parties.     

Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Clientelism and Intra‐Party Conflict in Ghana

We consider the effect of legislative primaries on the electoral performance of political parties in a new democracy. While existing literature suggests that primaries may either hurt a party by selecting extremist candidates or improve performance by selecting high valence candidates or improving a party’s image, these mechanisms may not apply where clientelism is prevalent. A theory of primaries built instead on a logic of clientelism with intra‐party conflict suggests different effects of legislative primaries for ruling and opposition parties, as well as spillover effects for presidential elections. Using matching with an original dataset on Ghana, we find evidence of a primary bonus for the opposition party and a primary penalty for the ruling party in the legislative election, while legislative primaries improve performance in the presidential election in some constituencies for both parties.     

From Fistfights to Firefights: Trait Aggression and Support for State Violence

Aggression is a fundamental component of human behavior, yet is mostly absent from scholarship on mass political behavior. This study proposes and tests a theory of state violence attitudes in which citizens develop preferences from aggressive personality traits. In an original nationally-representative survey, trait aggression strongly predicts support for violent state policies, as does its subcomponent trait anger, rivaling the power of partisanship. More provocatively, the well-documented gender gap in state violence attitudes replicated here is not attributable to sex differences in aggressive personality. This work builds on recent advances in political personality research and highlights the important role of aggression in political behavior.     

Ginsberg: Under the World

Liverpool Law Review -     

The real deal? The post-conflict constitution as a peace agreement

Abstract

When intra-state armed conflicts end through a negotiated settlement, the conflict parties frequently agree to amend or replace the country’s constitution. Their aim is to entrench the settlement, address the conflict incompatibility, reform institutions and take other measures to prevent a recurrence of violence. This article argues that post-conflict constitutions (PCCs) should be understood as peace agreements. It motivates this argument on conceptual, functional and legal grounds. It demonstrates that PCCs comply with conventional definitions of a peace agreement, are an intrinsic component of the conflict resolution process and have a range of peace maintenance functions. As supreme law, they become the definitive peace agreement. Research on peace durability following negotiated settlements should therefore focus not only on comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) but also on PCCs. PCCs should be conceived not as mere components of CPA implementation but as substantive political and legal agreements in their own right and as independent causes of peace.     

Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance

The concept of 'representation' is puzzling not because it lacks a central definition, but because that definition implies a paradox (being present and yet not present) and is too general to help reconcile the word's many senses with their sometimes conflicting implications.
Representation has a problematic relationship with democracy, with which it is often thoughtlessly equated. The two ideas have different, even conflicting, origins. Democracy came from ancient Greece and was won through struggle, from below. Greek democracy was participatory and bore no relationship to representation. Representation dates – at least as a political concept and practice – from the late medieval period, when it was imposed as a duty by the monarch. Only in the English Civil War and then in the eighteenth-century democratic revolutions did the two concepts become linked.
Democrats saw representation – with an extended suffrage – as making possible large-scale democracy. Conservatives instead saw it as a tool for staving off democracy. Rousseau also contrasted the two concepts, but favoured democratic self-government.
He was prescient in seeing representation as a threat to democracy. Representative government has become a new form of oligarchy, with ordinary people excluded from public life. This is not inevitable. Representation does make large-scale democracy possible, where it is based in participatory democratic politics at the local level.
Three obstacles block access to this possibility today: the scope of public problems and private power; money, or rather wealth; and ideas and their shaping, in an age of electronic media.