Decentralized planning in Kenya

In 1983 the Government of Kenya embarked on an accelerated programme of decentralization known as ‘District Focus’. This exercise in devolution is aimed at promoting more effective and efficient use of scarce domestic resources through efforts to strengthen planning capacity at the district level, improve horizontal integration among operating ministry field agents, and expand authority to district heads of operating ministries for managing financial and procurement aspects of local project implementation. Given the importance of this initiative to the economic growth of Kenya and the current search for administrative reforms that could help accelerate rural development in Africa, District Focus merits close attention by development experts. This article reviews the historical background, content, and implementation progress of District Focus.     

Government administration in a small microstate: Developing the Cayman Islands

The Cayman Islands use some of the increasingly familiar methods of resolving administratively the problems of smallness. The country's development and administrative performance depend on human resources which need to be planned in order to reduce dependence on outsiders, especially among the middle ranks of technical and professional staff. Education and training for the public service in the Cayman Islands is inadequate. Control of the administration is weak, especially among the independent boards and commissions, and there is a need for appeal procedures when the principles of natural justice have been breached. Political manipultion in personnel matters adversely affects performance, and there is a need for an effective civil service association to deal with other abuses. The problems of public administration are solved by scaling down the role of government in favour of private enterprise and against the provision of social welfare.     

Workers' compensation: coverage, benefits, and costs, 1985

The 84.3 million workers protected by workers' compensation laws in 1985 represented 87 percent of all wage and salary workers in that year. Both the amount of benefits paid to workers and the cost of the program to employers rose substantially from 1984 to 1985. Benefit payments totaled $22.5 billion-14.1 percent higher than in 1984 and the largest annual increase since 1978-79. About two-thirds of the payments in 1985 were money payments ($15.1 billion) and the remainder ($7.4 billion) went for medical care for disabled workers. Private insurance companies made nearly three-fifths of these payments and State funds and self-insured employers each paid about one-fifth of the total benefit amount in 1985. For the first time since 1978, the annual growth in employer costs exceeded the growth in workers' benefits, resulting in a slight decrease in the loss ratio for 1984-85. Employer costs were up nearly 17 percent from the previous year, reaching an estimated $29.3 billion. Covered payrolls increased by 7 percent in that same period. Total benefit payments as a percent of payroll also increased noticeably in 1985.     

Restraining the Governors: The Nordic Experience with Limiting the Strong State

The combination of a tradition of arbitrary royal government and popular intolerance, with the existence of extensive, unitary and highly centralized institutions of government, and with the dominance of government by a single, reformist party for more than a half century would seem a potent recipe for governmental abuse of individual and minority group rights. That is especially true in the absence of the formal constitutional safeguards used to preserve rights elsewhere Yet the Nordic democracies have in fact proved exemplary in protecting civil liberties Why? This article challenges the view that Nordic political societies are consensual historically or by nature, and it describes the limited traditional institutional checks on abuse of individual and minority rights by government Instead it finds the basis for the Nordic democracies' excellent record in civil liberties in the combination of (1) the development of new, non-traditional institutional checks on government. (2) the use of direct democracy as a check on parliamentary majorities. (3) the pervasive use of corporatist channels encompassing the major oppositional interest groups to draft and implement legislation, and (4) the effective constraints placed on decisions by parliamentary majorities by the pattern of fierce partisanship in the finely balanced parliamentary party constellation These protections for individual and minority liberties arise primarily from the assumption that basic conflicts of interest are a fact of political life and that they should be institutionalized.     

THE AMBITIONS OF POLICY DESIGN

There is no shortage of warnings concerning the hazards of excessive ambition in consciously-pursued public policy. In the light of these cautions, this paper considers the appropriate ambitions for policy design. The critics have missed the target. There is no need to fear ambition in policy design, provided that openness in communications about policy is secured.     

State Lotteries for Public Revenue

Lotteries, the state fiscal gimmick of the eighties, operate in jurisdictions encompassing substantially more than half the nation's population and enjoy considerable public acceptance. The revenue they generate is small, rarely more than two percent of state general revenue, it is subject to major year-to-year swings, and it is very expensive to generate, particularly when vendor commissions are recognized as part of cost. Furthermore, lotteries bear a high implicit excise tax rate and, because of the pattern of play across income classes, appears to worsen the overall equity of the revenue system. Their economic impact appears to be that of an internal transfer, although states with major lottery equipment suppliers have most to gain, particularly if they do not operate their own lottery. Lotteries are not destined to become mainstays of government finance, although their spread is likely, even with the fiscal questions they raise.     

From Voucher Auditing to Junkyard Dogs: The Evolution of Federal Inspectors General

Accountability in American government reaches as far back as the Continental Congress and General Washington's army. This tradition of accountability is carried on today by inspector general offices set up in almost every major department of the federal government. Through their audits and investigations, the inspectors general voice concerns over government internal controls, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Since 1981 they claim savings from their work totaling $92 billion.
"Some officials handle large sums of public money; it is therefore necessary to have other officials to receive and examine the accounts. These inspectors must administer no funds themselves. Different cities call them examiners, auditors, scrutineers and public advocates." These are the words of Aristotle in 325 B.C. Today, the United States government has its inspectors general to examine, audit, scrutinize, and advocate.