New findings on the transfer of computing applications among cities

This paper presents a study of the concepts of transferring computer technology among city governments. A sample of cities from a domestic population and an international population are used as the basis of the research. Contrary to expectation, and for both populations, the survey indicated the level of computer applications transfer among cities was found to be low compared to the amount of total application development. It was determined that an important source of transfer information was from “centers” such as the federal government, vendors, and transfer agencies, rather than city to city. International cities that were studied seem to experience a propensity toward centralized control at the national level. These controls often include the transfer of technical information. Further, the types of transfer may vary widely between the domestic vs the international cities. That is, domestic city transfers tend to be operations-oriented, while transfers from national centers tend to be management oriented. In general the study supported prior conclusions concerning the difficulties of transfer. The problem of mismatch and difficulties in modification make transfers very risky. Even so, there are many persons willing to take the risks in order to try to achieve lower costs and to realize the opportunity to obtain sophisticated applications.     

Membership in voluntary neighborhood associations and urban revitalization

This study examines patterns of membership in neighborhood associations in a revitalized neighborhood in a large midwestern city. The neighborhood is ethnically heterogenous and working class. The research assesses the extent of participation in local associations, its effect on revitalization, and differences between old-timers and newcomers.It was found that affiliation with neighborhood associations is wide spread both among old-timers and newcomers. However, young and affluent newcomers are particularly active. Moreover, whereas old-timers tend to be over-represented in traditional established associations, newcomers are more likely to join avant-garde and activist associations. Finally, membership accounts for residents' perception of their neighborhood and the extent to which they are involved in the revitalization process.This research was performed under grant RO MH 3526-01, NIMH, Center for Work and Mental Health.     

Economic incentives for the self-regulation of the release of price-sensitive information

Companies, as primary disseminators of information, and financial institutions, as major recipients, have economic incentives to self-regulate the transmission and usage of price-sensitive information. These include increased (lost) reputation costs and adverse share price penalties arising from poor management of information disclosure. The economic motivation for self-regulation is seen as conceptually linked to but distinct from legislative changes. Self-regulation has the strong support of economic efficiency arguments, whereas recent additional new legislative changes do not. This article examines a major corporate and institutional response to the new regulatory climate—to internalize part of the regulatory process during their regular relationship communications. Relationships between the case companies and institutions already exist for transaction purposes. They are used as a convenient and low-cost means to pursue self-regulation and to avoid errors of price-sensitive information release. This self-regulatory process is illustrated using case material. It is clear from the response pattern presented that the development of a self-regulatory framework by the parties has been an iterative one. The corporate and institutional systems that have been evolving seem to be significantly influenced by the regulatory trends. The regulatory changes appear to have played a role in increasing market costs incurred by those companies with poor stock market communication practices. The article ends by arguing that new proposals to change in the formal regulatory system should recognize that further legislation is unlikely to improve the poor prosecution record. Nevertheless, legislative changes can combine with and buttress the self-regulation process to create an effective regulatory system.