Inventing Egypt for the Emerging British Travel Class: Amelia Edwards' A Thousand Miles up the Nile

In 1877, the Victorian-era writer Amelia Edwards published a travelogue of her first excursion to Egypt. By placing her work within the context of British–Egyptian relations during the late nineteenth century, this article argues that works like hers created a romantic notion of ancient Egypt for the English middle class, and helped spawn English tourism to Egypt. Travel to Egypt encouraged popular support for Egyptology that ultimately helped the field to develop into a celebrated discipline. A variety of unpublished, archival material from the British National Archives and a collection of Amelia Edwards' private papers support these conclusions.     

Selling Hitler: propaganda and the Nazi brand

In this article we argue that Nazism functioned as a brand, and that this is key to our understanding of the extraordinary success of the Hitler regime in galvanising German public opinion. Nazis understood and manipulated the power of the brand, creating what amounts to a parallel universe of imagery and symbolism. The integuments of this brand strategy were the idea of Hitler himself and his projection, the stress on solidarity, the proclamation of a modernist Utopia with ancient accents, and the construction of an existential threat to the German way of life. But underpinning these were the deployment of what have become classic marketing concepts, such as targeting and segmentation, and a perceptive comprehension of the idea of packaging. Beyond this the regime was anchored in a kind of banality of ordinariness, it looked, at many levels, like a normal Western society and this element was made more credible by the promotion of a vigorous consumer culture. In many ways the Nazis were ahead of their time, masters of such political marketing arts as spin and rapid rebuttal. The fact that all this was done in the service of the most monstrous empire that was ever created, whose lasting legacy to the human race was its unique pictography of genocide, must alert us to the more sinister ends to which political marketing can be perverted. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The phenomenology of sharing: social media networking,asserting, and telling

This article takes up the current promise of computer‐aided social networks as mechanisms for sharing in experiences. The author examines social networks phenomenologically, not merely as a tool for providing information and shaping what we think but as a social construct for what can be shared, how we think, and what can be known. The analysis identifies a connection between social networks and artificial intelligence systems, while also suggesting that significant experiential gaps built into the systems can lead to distortions in the ontology of shared experiences. The author argues, by applying concepts from Kant, Arendt, Schutz, and Heidegger, that computerized social networks offer an unparalleled opportunity for public administrators to discover and learn about social conditions, but these networks are not without significant limitations. An appreciation for the limits to sharing implicit in computerized social networks and artificial intelligence systems can be made explicit by applying concepts from phenomenology. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The nature of economic perceptions in mass publics

Voters who believe that the nation's economy has been worsening are more inclined to vote against the incumbent president than are those who believe it has not been getting worse. This relationship could be present because voters condition their support for the incumbents upon their perceptions of the economy, or, alternatively, because they condition their perceptions of the economy upon their underlying, partisan-based support of the incumbents.     

Re-entering the Lists: MI5's Authorized History and the August 1914 Arrests

Abstract

The 2009 Authorized History of MI5 carried a new defence of its August 1914 operation, in which Vernon Kell, its first Director, supposedly scored a coup by capturing all 21 German agents working in Britain. The Authorized History went against the version of events given in my article ‘Entering the Lists’, published by this journal in 2006, and backed up its case with a new arrest list. This article considers that new list, and its supposed origins in an MI5 document from 1931. Once again it demonstrates the impossibility of turning MI5's foundation myth into history, by showing that not only is the account in the Authorized History internally inconsistent, but the arrest list consists of 22 names arbitrarily selected from later case summaries, then wrongly footnoted to an MI5 document which contains a different list of 21 names. Indeed, by claiming authority from the only arrest list known to have been challenged within MI5 itself, the Authorized History merely reinforces the conclusion that Kell fabricated his most famous victory.     

A Comment on Diagnostic Tools for Counterfactual Inference

Alexander Michaelides London School of Economics, Department of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK e-mail: a.michaelides{at}lse.ac.uk We evaluate two diagnostic tools used to determine if counterfactualanalysis requires extrapolation. Counterfactuals based on extrapolationare model dependent and might not support empirically validinferences. The diagnostics help researchers identify thosecounterfactual "what if" questions that are empirically plausible.We show, through simple Monte Carlo experiments, that thesediagnostics will often detect extrapolation, suggesting thatthere is a risk of biased counterfactual inference when thereis no such risk of extrapolation bias in the data. This is becausethe diagnostics are affected by what we call the n/k problem:as the number of data points relative to the number of explanatoryvariables decreases, the diagnostics are more likely to detectthe risk of extrapolation bias even when such risk does notexist. We conclude that the diagnostics provide too severe atest for many data sets used in political science. Author's note: We thank Komei Fukuda, Don Green, Alan Gerber,and Jasjeet Sekhon for their generous help, Mike Kane for assistancewith R programming, and five anonymous referees for constructivecomments.     

Broken Promises or Selective Memory Planning? A National Picture of HOPE VI Plans and Realities

Government efforts to redevelop public housing often face a contentious gap between plans and realities. This paper compares 2014 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administrative data on housing unit counts and unit mixes for all 260 developments receiving Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) revitalization grants with data provided in the original HOPE VI grant award announcements. We find that HUD records undercount approximately 11,500 once-proposed units. The biggest changes were a 29% decline in the number of market-rate units and a 40% decline in homeownership units. The chief shortfall during implementation, therefore, was not with public housing units (although the HOPE VI program as a whole did trigger an overall decline of such units). To help elucidate the dynamics at play when the unit allocation shifts between initial grant award and implemented project, we include a series of five brief case studies that illustrate several types of unit change. Interviews with HUD staff confirm the baseline for record-keeping shifted during implementation once project economic feasibility became clearer; adherence to original unit mix proposals remained secondary. HUD prioritized its accountability to Congress and developers over its public law accountability to build the projects initially proposed to local community residents. Although these changes have sometimes been interpreted as broken promises, it is even clearer that HUD’s monitoring system exemplifies what we call Selective Memory Planning: when planners and policy makers, willfully or not, selectively ignore elements of previous plans in favor of new plans that are easier to achieve.     

Do State Affordable Housing Appeals Systems Backfire? A Natural Experiment

Several U.S. states have supplemented traditional judicial review of local land-use regulation with a state affordable housing appeals system (SAHAS). Empirical evidence indicates that a SAHAS can increase the proportion of housing that is affordable to low- and moderate-income households. But some scholars have suggested that an effective SAHAS will ultimately backfire, by producing incentives to prohibit market-rate development, thereby rendering a state’s housing stock less affordable overall. We test this “backfire” hypothesis with a longitudinal comparison of single-family housing development from 1980 through 2007 in municipalities located in adjacent areas of Connecticut (which adopted a SAHAS in 1989) and New York State (which did not have a SAHAS during the study period). Contrary to the predictions of the backfire hypothesis, our fixed effects regression indicates that Connecticut's SAHAS was associated with increased single-family development relative to the New York State jurisdictions in our sample. This result suggests that a SAHAS can increase below-market rate and mixed-income development without impeding market-rate development.     

What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos

In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.