The Grecian horse: does immigration lead to the deterioration of American institutions?

Concerns about the institutional impact of immigration, particularly in the United States, are not new. We can trace them back to Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton. More recently, in response to a literature that questions the desirability of current immigration restrictions, Borjas (J Econ Lit 53:961–974, 2015) speculates that immigrants coming from countries with poor institutions could reduce substantially the institutional quality in the United States to a point where it could negate all economic gains associated with immigration in terms of GDP and income. Using the Economic Freedom of North America index since 1980, we find no evidence to corroborate Borjas’s concerns. However, we find mixed evidence that immigration increases minimum wages and union density.     

Role of Social Media in the 2016 Iowa Caucuses

Social media have become an indispensable tool in modern political campaigns, yet little is known about their impact, especially at the important primary and caucus stages of the US presidential elections. This study investigates the effects of visiting political party and candidate websites as well as following presidential candidates, posting political comments, and liking or sharing political content on social media on participation in the primary stage of the 2016 US election. The results of a precaucus survey in Iowa show that active use of social media tends to have positive effects, while passive social media use has a negative impact on likelihood of caucus attendance. Recommendations for campaigns include redirecting attention away from passive website viewing and developing social media content that will generate likes and shares.     

SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT: A UTAH PERSPECTIVE

The authority to regulate the coal industry a t the state level, under state statute and rules, the importance of the coal industry to the state, the importance of an environmentally sound regulatory program, and the benefit of a state-managed abandoned mine reclamation program, in short the ability of the state to manage its own natural resources, make state primacy a necessity, not an option.
Implementation of SMCRA cannot be measured in the myriad of oversight statistics. Effectiveness means cost-effective, timely reclamation of abandoned sites; consistent, workable rules and regulatory practices; responsive program management; and compliance which is internalized in the mine's operations.     

The executive on the battlefield: government amendments and cartel theory in the Chilean Congress

This article argues that cartelised coordination inside Chilean congressional committees is important for understanding the success rates of presidential initiatives. By way of an analysis of the amendment process undertaken both in the Chamber and Senate committees in the Chilean Congress during 2006–10, the authors review the approval patterns of legislative amendments. The analysis suggests two chief findings: coordination between government parties and the executive is crucial for the success of amendment; and the opposition’s success in generating legal transformations depends on the construction of inter-coalition alliances. It is hoped that the perspective offered here will contribute to the current literature on cartel party theory in Latin America.     

Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy

Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This article proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These nonpecuniary costs imply that campaigns influence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk. They influence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously—but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we find that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important benefits beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.