Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016

ABSTRACT

Does the executive's institutional hegemony represent a risk to the survival of democracy? By hegemony, we refer to the president's ability to control other institutions, particularly the legislature and judiciary. To answer this question, we develop two indices of presidential hegemony and analyze the duration of democratic regimes in 18 Latin American countries between 1925 and 2016. The results show that executive hegemony is a major driver of democratic instability. This finding is robust to non-linear effects and to potential endogeneity in the relationship between presidential power and democratic backsliding. Our findings challenge traditional concerns about executive-legislative deadlock, and have significant implications for the nascent literature on democratic backsliding, which highlights executive aggrandizement as a risk factor.     

Is there still a place for gene patents in Australia? Implications of recent United States and European case law

This article considers the ramifications of recent United States and European litigation relating to patents claiming rights to genes associated with hereditary forms of breast cancer (the so-called BRCA genes) for recently commenced Australian litigation relating to the same subject matter. The article is contextualised with brief summaries of the relevant patent law, the science of genetics, the history of the BRCA genes and an overview of the activities of the patent holder. The analysis of first instance and appeal decisions on the validity of the United States BRCA patents shows the final outcome is still highly uncertain in that jurisdiction, while the European litigation provides little assistance in predicting the outcome of the Australian action. This article concludes that the outcome of the Australian litigation is an issue that cannot be determined with any certainty due to the lack of specific, relevant precedents both in Australia and in other jurisdictions.     

Changes in the Rules of the Lawmaking Process and the Success of Presidential Bills: Chile, 1990–2018

This article assesses the effect of changes in the lawmaking process on the success of the president’s legislative agenda, distinguishing between within-term success (bills that passed during the term) and overall success (including bills that passed after the president left office). With the 2064 presidential bills introduced in seven terms (1990–2018) in Chile’s presidential system, we assess the impact of changes in lawmaking rules on within-term (59.9%) and overall success (70.6%). Changes that decrease attributions of the president and create more opportunities for executive-legislative bargaining—including concurrent elections—increase the chances of success of presidential bills. The use of presidential urgency motions, an agenda-setting tool, makes bills more likely to pass, but the issuance of many urgency motions undermines the bill’s chances to succeed. Presidential bills introduced early in the term and those on issues where there is more policy convergence are more likely to pass.