NATO's nuclear addiction – 12 steps to ‘kick the habit’

The article argues that NATO is a nuclear-addicted alliance. It focuses on how the addiction developed, the damage caused by the addiction and ways in which it may be overcome. After outlining the origins to NATO's nuclear addiction, the article turns to the recent defence and deterrence posture review (DDPR), which is seen as a classic example of ‘addict behaviour’ spoiling the best chance NATO has had for overcoming its addiction. The article offers an assessment of the DDPR, portraying the outcome of the process as not only a lost opportunity, but unfortunately also as a position that limits the possibilities for reaching a constructive agreement on the important question of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. The article ends by suggesting 12 steps for NATO to overcome its addiction, although it is acknowledged that the DDPR has severely restricted NATO's room for maneuver leaving only a slim chance for ‘complete recovery’.     

The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms

We analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break-Through rule on 1,035 European firms with dual class shares. In 3–5 pct. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, while in another 11–17 pct. of the firms, the controlling owners are likely to incur a loss of control. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to incur a loss of control. The restrictions that the Break-Through rule put on the ability of these firms to issue new shares to outsiders without changing the control structure are also estimated. We conclude that a significant number of firms with dual class shares in the European Union will be affected by a 75 pct. Break-Through rule.     

The Danish Election 1998

The article analyzes the Danish national election in March 1998. Jdged from the aggregate figures, Denmark has stabilized. Net volatility was moderate, 'bloc' volatility was close to zero, and despite forecasts of a non-socialist victory, the Social Democratic-led government managed to continue. Further, in the 1990s, the periods between elections have been close to the maximum four years. Therefore, the old picture from the 1970s of Danish politics as highly unstable and as extremely volatile is now outdated. Quite the contrary at the level of individual voters. Close to a third shifted from one party to another, and even among voters who did not shift, a substantial proportion had considered voting for another party. Individual voter mobility seems to be a result of weak voter differentiation between different parties, and not a result of protest and outspoken dissatisfaction. Whatever the explanation, individual volatility is an omen of possible future instability: There is no guarantee that different voter movements will always balance out.     

Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict

In this study we resolve part of the confusion over how foreign aid affects armed conflict. We argue that aid shocks—severe decreases in aid revenues—inadvertently shift the domestic balance of power and potentially induce violence. During aid shocks, potential rebels gain bargaining strength vis‐à‐vis the government. To appease the rebels, the government must promise future resource transfers, but the government has no incentive to continue its promised transfers if the aid shock proves to be temporary. With the government unable to credibly commit to future resource transfers, violence breaks out. Using AidData's comprehensive dataset of bilateral and multilateral aid from 1981 to 2005, we evaluate the effects of foreign aid on violent armed conflict. In addition to rare‐event logit analysis, we employ matching methods to account for the possibility that aid donors anticipate conflict. The results show that negative aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset.     

Three faces of political marketing strategy

The term strategy is appearing with great frequency in the political marketing literature. However, the concept of political marketing strategy has been criticized for being unidimensional, ill‐defined and neglecting the contingencies of strategy theories. This article argues that a minimal definition and a division of epistemological terms could respond to the outlined critique. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparison of five DNA quantification methods

Six commercial preparations of human genomic DNA were quantified using five quantification methods: UV spectrometry, SYBR-Green dye staining, slot blot hybridization with the probe D17Z1, Quantifiler™ Human DNA Quantification kit and RB1 rt-PCR. All methods measured higher DNA concentrations than expected based on the information by the manufacturers. UV spectrometry, SYBR-Green dye staining, slot blot and RB1 rt-PCR gave 39, 27, 11 and 12%, respectively, higher concentrations than expected based on the manufacturers’ information. The DNA preparations were quantified using the Quantifiler™ Human DNA Quantification kit in two experiments. The measured DNA concentrations with Quantifiler were 125 and 160% higher than expected based on the manufacturers’ information. When the Quantifiler™ human DNA standard (Raji cell line) was replaced by the commercial human DNA preparation G147A (Promega) to generate the DNA standard curve in the Quantifiler™ Human DNA Quantification kit, the DNA quantification results of the human DNA preparations were 31% higher than expected based on the manufacturers’ information. The results indicate a calibration problem with the Quantifiler™ human DNA standard for its use with the Quantifiler™ Human DNA Quantification kit. The possible reasons for the problem are discussed and a solution is suggested. The results emphasise the need for standard reference DNA material and standard methods for DNA quantification.