Wage – labour activities by agricultural households in Nicaragua

This article considers wage?–?labour activities by agricultural households in Nicaragua. It analyses the role of: (1) comparative advantage as determined by individual and household characteristics; and (2) agricultural conditions and market imperfections, in shaping wage?–?labour supply. An econometric specification is developed which allows for random household-specific effects. Results reveal that non-agricultural wage work is largely determined by comparative advantages, whereas agricultural wage work is used to deal with a number of agricultural conditions and market imperfections.     

Attitudes towards European Integration and the Danish Common Market Referendum

The article analyses survey data on the role played by the issue of European integration in the Danish Common Market referendum 1972. Despite a 2:1 vote in favor of membership, support for supranational European integration was low; in fact, integration as an issue was considerably more salient to opponents of membership than supporters who tended to vote mainly for tangible, i.e. economic reasons. As many as one-fourth of the sample voted for membership though being highly anti-integrationist, either because of disbelief in the dynamics of integration, because of the higher saliency of tangible benefits, or because of identification with strongly pro-market parties.     

Vetospieler und die Durchsetzbarkeit von Side‐Payments

Once an agreement is signed at the international level, it can no longer be modified during the domestic decision‐making process. However, it is possible to compensate potential veto players by a purely domestic legislative act. Under which circumstances do such side‐payments make sense, and what is the role played by political strategies? In order to be compensated, an actor needs to be considered a veto player. Furthermore, the defenders of the international agreement must have a sufficiently large interest in its ratification to be willing to offer compensations. These basic conditions fulfilled, the existence or not of side‐payments depends on the strategic interactions between the political actors. In the last ten years, Swiss citizens had to vote twice on an international agreement establishing free movement of persons. In both cases, the unions asked for flanking measures; while they failed in their attempt in the context of the European Economic Area, they succeeded in the case of the bilateral agreements. This difference in outcome is all the more surprising since in both cases the unions were in a veto player position and the export oriented economy had a strong interest in the ratification of the agreements. This article explains the different fate of the unions' claims by stressing the role of changes in actor strategies. The credibility of the threat to block the decision‐making process and the succession of the game sequences are in this perspective of paramount importance. By using strategically the veto threat, domestic groups such as unions are able to benefit from internationalisation.