AN EVALUATION OF FURTHER REFORMS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS

By 1992, the party of the majority, the Democratic Party, will have been out of power for twenty years of a twenty-four year span. Since 1968, numerous reforms in the presidential nominating process have been considered and adopted by the Democrats. These reforms have had the effect of opening the nominating process to rank-and-file Democrats through state primaries and participatory caucuses. While the reforms achieve this purpose, the end result is a mixed system that has been described as a disjointed hodgepodge of rules.
This article presents ten criteria of a sound nomination system. Then a panel of researchers and practitioners weighs seven options for further reform against the ten criteria. Several policy options are considered by the panel as improvements over the current presidential nomination system.     

Boom and Bust Budgeting: Repetitive Budgetary Processes in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana

One of the least studied topics in comparative budgeting is how governments budget during economic and boom and bust cycles. Theory and past evidence suggest that national budgets of poorer countries are made and remade continuously over these periods. Case material from Nigeria as well as supplemental information from Ghana and Kenya illustrate the principal features of the persistence, types, and sequence of such repetitive budgeting. The experience of the three countries in boom and bust budgeting has considerable implications both for a theory of comparative budgeting and for national budget management and policy in Subsaharan Africa specifically.     

The state of nature in the shadow of contract formation: Adding a missing link to J.M. Buchanan's social contract theory

The social contract theory of J.M. Buchanan provides no clear-cut answer on the question which one of the multitude of possible Pareto-efficient contracts is chosen by individuals who shape a contract in an (imaginary) state of nature. This deficiency is remedied in this paper by adding the Nash-bargaining theory. It seems to be in line with at least part of Buchanan's reasoning. Whereas for Buchanan the configuration of contract depends unilaterally on the natural equilibrium of the state of nature, we are able to show that the parties' (rational) contractual expectations have repercussions for their behavior in the state of nature. That is why the location of the natural equilibrium proves to be heavily dependent on the chosen bargaining theory. The implication is that assessing the legitimacy of a given constitutional order or contract (on the basis of the natural equilibrium) depends on the particular bargaining theory chosen to solve the underlying constitutional distribution problem. I am grateful to D. Andrews, D. Schmidtchen and U. Witt for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The usual caveat applies.