Book reviews

William C. Green and Theodore Karasik (Eds.), Gorbachev and his Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine (Westview Press, 1990, 239pp. ISBN 0–8133–7898–2)

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Harvard University Press, 1990)

Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 1989. ISBN 0–8014–2125–X.

Scalpino, R.A., The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth‐Century Asia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, pp.131)

Sean M. Lynn‐Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen van Evera (Eds.), Soviet Military Policy (MIT Press, 1989. £26.95 [cloth]; £13.50 [paperback]).     

The establishment of the presence and group classification of sperm in mixed stains by isoelectric focusing

The article deals with experimental data on design of the method used for detection of sperm, blood and vaginal secretions according to isoelectric points of acid phosphatases, differential diagnosis of ABO group antigens in "mixed" stains as well as detection of phenotype of red cell acid phosphatase by isoelectric focusing method.     

Morality and diversity

His recent articles include "Voluntary Donations and Public Expenditures in a Federalist System," "The Revealed Objective Functions of Nonprofit Firms," "Economic Perspectives on Regulation of Charitable Solicitation," and "Profits as Incentives within Nonprofit firms." He is currently working on a book entitled Regulating the Nonprofit Sectorand has begun research on perceptual models of choice that integrate psychology and economics.     

Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry

The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve fair competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of unfair foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on Economics and Power organized by the FWS Institute of Zug and held at Interlaken, Switzerland in July 1988.     

Tollison costs and technological innovation: The case of environmental regulation

This paper departs from the Tullock cost paradigm that views competition for monopoly privilege as a welfare-inimical process that wastefully dissipates preexisting producers' surplus and, occasionally, leads to inefficient increases in costs and counterproductive uses of scarce resources. The potential availability of rent-seeking may bring about the elimination of inefficient regulatory regimes that retard or prevent the introduction of cost-reducing innovations. Air quality management is but one area in which innovation rent-seeking holds promise for concrete welfare gains. Researchers may wish to focus on institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the transactions costs and free rider disincentives to the formation of a coalition to seek innovation rents. An example of such a mechanism might be a joint venture that requires all venture members to engage in lobbying and to contribute to collective research efforts. These unaddressed questions await future research.The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Gordon Tullock, Robert D. Tollison, Michael T. Marlow and J.R. Clark. The usual caveats apply. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of their employers.