Really Responsive Regulation

Really Responsive Regulation seeks to add to current theories of enforcement by stressing the case for regulators to be responsive not only to the attitude of the regulated firm but also to the operating and cognitive frameworks of firms; the institutional environment and performance of the regulatory regime; the different logics of regulatory tools and strategies; and to changes in each of these elements. The approach pervades all the different tasks of enforcement activity: detecting undesirable or non-compliant behaviour; developing tools and strategies for responding to that behaviour; enforcing those tools and strategies; assessing their success or failure; and modifying them accordingly. The value of the approach is shown by outlining its potential application to UK environmental and fisheries controls. Putting the system into effect is itself challenging but failing to regulate really responsively can constitute an expensive process of shooting in the dark.     

Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire

Since 2016, the UK government has outlined plans for ‘Global Britain’ as a framework for post‐Brexit foreign policy. Some criticise the idea as a vision of ‘Empire 2.0’, but it is rarely made clear exactly what form it takes or what its wider political implications are. This article argues that Global Britain constitutes not just an idea or a slogan, but a foreign policy narrative and, more specifically, the narrative of empire. Indeed, to appear reasonable its grand ambitions require pre‐existing knowledges of past imperial ‘successes’ and accepting images of empire among the British public. Yet Global Britain lacks efficacy: as a domestic rather than an international narrative, by being inherently regressive in its worldview, and for contradicting the preferences of international partners on which the UK heavily relies. These narrative flaws, it is argued, make Global Britain an actively problematic, rather than merely ineffective, component of UK foreign policy.     

Sorting Out Sortition: A Perspective on the Random Selection of Political Officers

The central argument of this article is that it is possible to identify one major or primary potential that sortition brings to the political community when it is used to select office holders. This is to be found when sortition is used in such a way as to maximise its most essential feature – its arationality – and where such an application has the most significant and positive impact on the political process and the political community. In such applications the advantages of using an arational process can be seen as outweighing its disadvantages. In political practice – especially in a republican context – this primary political potential is the ability of sortition to protect the public process of selection from subversion by those who might wish to use it for their own private or partisan ends. This helps to defend the polity from those seeking to exercise unconstitutional or arbitrary power – either in the form of a single tyrant or of factions vying for partisan control. In addition, sortition can produce a series of secondary benefits to the republican polity: the polity can be understood as impartial, the threshold to citizen participation can be lowered and the model of the independent citizen encouraged. These benefits, however, can be seen as deriving from initial protection of the process of selection from manipulation – a quality of lot which is present whatever the motivation of those instigating a particular lottery scheme. Although the political use of lot cannot be confined to the protection of open government, its potential to limit the power of individuals or covert groupings makes it naturally commensurate with this role.     

Expanding the Constitution Beyond the Court: The Case of Euro-Constitutionalism

The paper addresses the role of the Court of Justice in the European integration process, as well as, more broadly, tensions between constitutionalism and new governance. I propose an account, according to which the judiciary should not be seen as standing in an aloof place in the political order, and as opposed to a—pluralistic, irrational, and anarchical—society, but rather as part of a continuum on which other governance arrangements are also placed according to their share in 'tribunality'—the deliberativeness of their decision-making processes and their openness to new facts.