ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICIZATION OR CONTESTABILITY? HOW POLITICAL ADVISERS AFFECT NEUTRAL COMPETENCE IN POLICY PROCESSES

There is limited empirical research on the extent to which politicized recruitment of ministerial advisers affects the quality of the policy process. In this article we take a novel step by looking at two possible consequences of increased political recruitment for the policy process: administrative politicization and contestability. We deploy a Most Similar Systems comparison of Denmark and Sweden and include survey answers from 657 civil servants in managerial positions. We find that political recruitment of top civil servants, such as Swedish state secretaries, restricts the access of the civil service to the minister, but it does not substantially politicize the policy process. Danish civil servants perceive themselves as more contested by the relatively few Danish political advisers than their Swedish colleagues. Our results imply that the organization of political advice is a crucial factor for politicization and contestability     

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM – GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE

Failure to understand the political nature of administrative reform and to develop a political strategy to overcome resistance lies behind the failure of many reform attempts. The prerequisites of reform include political will, time, resources, an ongoing institution promoting change, and a strategy which concentrates on the implementation stage when resistance is strongest. Such a strategy must use the principal levers of change, including legislation, which directly affect administrative behaviour. In Australia in the 1970s administrative reform proceeded only slowly with the exception of changes in some States and the introduction of a new body of Federal administrative law. A better reform strategy in the past two years has resulted in extensive legislative change at the Federal level including greater ministerial control over certain senior appointments, open public competition for the top one per cent of civil service jobs, affirmative action and industrial democracy. There has thus been a further shift towards a unique Australian model of public administration.     

‘THE GREAT DOCK AND DOLE SWINDLE’: ACCOUNTING FOR THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PORT TRANSPORT DEREGULATION AND THE DOCK LABOUR COMPENSATION SCHEME*

Deregulation of the port transport industry was predicted to bring much needed jobs and investment to Britain's ailing dockland areas, lower prices for port users and consumers, and improved international competitiveness. These benefits were anticipated to far exceed any attendant costs. But the benefits have failed to materialize, largely because the government failed to appreciate the non-competitive structure of the industry or the effects of the National Dock Labour Scheme on the economic performance of the ports, while the costs were substantially underestimated. Consequently, the costs of deregulation have exceeded the benefits. As in the past, current industrial policy has been dictated by the apparent‘labour problems’of the docks, but the new system of deregulation, founded on the mass redundancy of exregistered dockers and a re-assertion of managerial prerogative, has exacerbated rather than resolved the underlying structural weaknesses of the industry. In particular, deregulation has ushered in a new era of casual employment on the docks. Unless, or until, public policy addresses these problems the costs of deregulation will continue to accumulate.