INDIVIDUAL STABILITY OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADULTHOOD: TESTING THE STABILITY POSTULATE OF MOFFITT'S DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY*

This paper presents a test of Moffitt's (1993) prediction on the stability of longitudinal antisocial behavior, using data from the South‐Holland Study. Aggressive (overt) and non‐aggressive antisocial (covert) behaviors were measured when subjects were 6–11 years old, and at follow‐ups when they were 12–17 years old and 20–25 years old. In accordance with the postulate, we did find a higher level of stability of overt behavior from childhood to adulthood, compared with childhood to adolescence, especially in combination with early manifestations of status violations and/or covert behavior in childhood. Results related to the stability of covert behavior were not in accordance with the prediction, but did support the recently proposed adjustment to the starting age of the adult phase.     

MODELLING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL BUDGET SECTOR 1982-1992

A substantial literature exists on the economic analysis of bureaucracy, which includes formal models of bureaucratic behaviour by Niskanen (1971) and Dunleavy (1991). This article develops hypotheses from those models about changes in size of bureaux over time and tests them against data on the Australian federal budget sector in 1982–83 and 1991–92. The models predict that bureaucrats usually will be able to influence the size or structure of their bureaux in line with their personal preferences. However, the Australian data suggest that the extent of such influence may be less than is assumed in either model and that the preferences of politicians are more influential than the models allow. One conclusion is that, if bureaucracy is to be modelled, a principal-agent approach will have more to offer than the neo-classical maximizing framework adopted by Niskanen in particular. A further conclusion, at odds with those of Niskanen and weakening his case for wholesale privatization, is that bureaucratic dysfunctions may be amenable to reform of the political and bureaucratic rules and systems.     

Government Redistribution in the Shadow of Legislative Elections: A Study of the Illinois Member Initiative Grants Program

We study an Illinois state government program called “member initiative spending” and examine the extent to which three competing theories can explain the program's allocations among Illinois's 118 House districts. We show that member initiative monies distributed before the 2000 general election were disproportionately allocated to districts that were politically competitive, represented by legislative leaders, or represented by moderate legislators. Our analysis supports theories that claim budgetary decisions made by elected officials are tactical, and it shows that the Illinois decision makers who allocated member initiative funds sought to distribute them in a way that would be most beneficial in the sense of vote buying.