ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICIZATION OR CONTESTABILITY? HOW POLITICAL ADVISERS AFFECT NEUTRAL COMPETENCE IN POLICY PROCESSES

There is limited empirical research on the extent to which politicized recruitment of ministerial advisers affects the quality of the policy process. In this article we take a novel step by looking at two possible consequences of increased political recruitment for the policy process: administrative politicization and contestability. We deploy a Most Similar Systems comparison of Denmark and Sweden and include survey answers from 657 civil servants in managerial positions. We find that political recruitment of top civil servants, such as Swedish state secretaries, restricts the access of the civil service to the minister, but it does not substantially politicize the policy process. Danish civil servants perceive themselves as more contested by the relatively few Danish political advisers than their Swedish colleagues. Our results imply that the organization of political advice is a crucial factor for politicization and contestability     

THE VALUE OF CHOICE IN PUBLIC POLICY

Conceptualizing and measuring choice is problematic both in theory and in practice. Measuring by counting the alternatives seems counter-intuitive as a smaller set of better or more diverse alternatives seems to provide more choice than one that is simply larger. However, concentrating upon better alternatives leads to choice being defined by welfare or utility which is also counter-intuitive. The implications of this paradox are considered in relation to examples drawn from the choice agenda in British social policy. Empirical difficulties in measuring the welfare gains through implementing greater choice at a time of other central-led policy initiatives such as targets are discussed, and the extant evidence discussed. Criteria for judging whether or not choice has been welfare-enhancing are suggested. It is argued that 'soft choice' where service providers provide information and explain different options is preferable to 'hard' choice of simplistic targets to increase choice by ticking target boxes.