Generational equity or privatization of social security?

He is primary author of Ties That Bind: The Interdependence of Generations,a study that examines the framing of the generational equity debate. He is currently doing research for a book concerning the planning of retirement of the baby boom generation.     

An analysis of legislative inefficiency and ideological behavior

This paper explores the theory of legislative inefficiency and the role of ideological preferences of legislators. It is shown that inefficiency can be caused by many factors other than legislative ideological behavior. Three major sources are emphasized: cost of voting and policy position information asymmetries across groups of voters and barriers to entry in political competition. Ideological preferences of legislators is not a cause of inefficiency independently. Legislators who care about both policy and winning will give inefficient representation to their constituents only when groups of voters are prevented from participating equally in the legislative process.     

Institutional features of congressional decisions: The fight to prohibit smoking on airlines

A pervasive theme of the congressional politics literature is that the committee system is fundamental in determining the policy status quo. Such an assertion hinges crucially upon committees controlling their jurisdictions; congressional delegation is undermined if a committee can assert authority over any issue domain at any time. Yet, representatives may possess an incentive to support a policy proposal that would change the status quo, even if it entails disregarding procedures. Indeed, standard conceptualizations of how members of Congress make their voting choices assume that only the benefits and costs associated with a policy matter, and they do not consider institutional factors such as whether a bill emerged from the correct committee.This analysis examines whether representatives will sacrifice policy interests to preserve institutional features of the legislature. The effort in 1987 to curb smoking on airplanes — which became embroiled in a difficult-to-resolve jurisdictional dispute — serves as a vehicle to analyze how sensitive members are to such features. The results demonstrate that a sizable number put aside their [generally moderate] policy preferences and voted against limits on smoking for institutional reasons. These findings have important implications both for specifying the determinants of policy change and for understanding institutional stability.     

Thinking land law differently: Section 70(1)(g) and the giving of meanings

Elements of this article first appeared in a paper given at the Hart Conference on Property, 1993.     

Public promotion of new technology ventures: an agency perspective

Abstract: Understanding the proper role of government in the promotion of small technology-oriented firms is a priority given the potential benefits to society as a whole and the inability of traditional market mechanisms to adequately nurture such firms. Further, designing the appropriate public policies to sufficiently satisfy the involved stakeholders has typically proven to be an elusive pursuit. With these issues in mind, this paper applies the concept of agency theory to evaluate government programs seeking to promote technology start-ups. A new program associated with the Innovation Ontario Corporation, which utilizes equity joint ventures between government and small technology-oriented firms, is described and evaluated using the agency perspective. Suggestions are made for further inquiry and analysis. Sommaire: Il importe de cerner le rôle adéquat du gouvernement dans la promotion des petites entreprises technologiques, étant donné, d'une part, les avantages potentiels pour la société dans son ensemble, et d'autre part, l'incapacité des mécanismes classiques du marchéà favoriser comme il le faut l'évolution de ces entreprises. De plus, en régle générale, les efforts visant àélaborer des politiques publiques appropriées et satisfaisantes pour les intervenants en question se sont révélés aléatoires. Compte tenu de tout cela, le présent article applique la théorie des agences pour évaluer les programmes gouvemementaux qui visent à faciliter le démarrage d'entreprises technologiques. Nous décrivons et nous évaluons ici, dans la perspective des agences, un nouveau programme associéà la Société Innovation Ontario, qui fait appel aux co-entreprises avec participation au capital pour le gouvernement et les petites entreprises technologiques. Nous proposons aussi des suggestions pour des enquêtes et analyses plus poussées.     

FCC v. The States: Who Shall Regulate Intrastate Telecommunications?

The 1934 Communications Act established a dual system of federaland State telecommunications regulation. The act gave the FederalCommunications Commission (FCC) authority to regulate interstateand foreign telecommunications but not intrastate communications,a market reserved for the states. As part of its move to deregulatethe telecommunications market in the 1970s, the FCC sought toextend its jurisdiction by preempting state regulatory authorityover telecommunications activities traditionally consideredintrastate. In 1986, however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in itsdecision in Louisiana Public Service, restricted federal preemptionof state laws and reinforced the dual regulatory system. Withthe break-up of AT&T, the FCC has renewed its preemptionactivities, claiming that the preemption is necessary in orderto foster an efficient nationwide telecommunications system.Several cases now pending in federal courts will test the breadthand depth of the Supreme Court's holding in Louisiana PublicService, and thereby, the future of the dual regulatory system.