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881.
This article analyzes the impact of policy variables--employer accommodations, state Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) allowance rates, and DI benefits--on the timing of an application for DI benefits by workers with a work-limiting health condition starting when their health condition first begins to bother them. The analysis uses a rich mixture of personal and employer characteristics from the Health and Retirement Study linked to Social Security administrative records. We find that most workers do not apply immediately for DI benefits when they are first bothered by a health condition. On the contrary, the median working-age man with a work-limiting condition waits 7 years after that time before applying, and the median working-age woman waits 8 years. Although the risk of applying for benefits is greatest in the year following onset, only 16 percent of men and 13 percent of women in our sample apply within the first year, and the risk of application falls thereafter. That finding suggests that institutional factors, in addition to health factors, may play a role in the timing of DI applications. Using kernel density estimates of the distribution of application and nonapplication ordered by state allowance rates (the rate of acceptance per DI determination in each state), we find that both men and women who live in states with high allowance rates are disproportionately more likely to apply for benefits in the first year after their condition begins to bother them than are those in states with low allowance rates. Using life-table analysis, we also find that men and women who are accommodated by their employers are significantly less likely to apply for DI benefits in each of the first few years after their condition begins to bother them than are those who are not accommodated. On the basis of this evidence, we include these policy variables in a model of the timing of DI application that controls for other socioeconomic variables as well as health. Using a hazard model, we find that workers who live in states with higher allowance rates apply for DI benefits significantly sooner than those living in states with lower allowance rates following the onset of a work-limiting health condition. Workers who are accommodated following the onset of a work-limiting health condition, however, are significantly slower to apply for DI benefits. Using the mean values of all explanatory variables, we estimate the relative importance of changes in these policy variables on the speed with which workers apply for benefits after onset. We find that the mean time until application for men is 10.22 years. Universal accommodations following onset would delay application by 4.36 years. In contrast, a 20 percent decrease in state allowance rates would delay application by only 0.88 years. For working-age women, the average expected time until application once a condition begins to bother them is 10.58 years. Universal accommodations would delay that by 3.76 years, and a 20 percent decrease in allowance rates would delay it by 1.47 years. A complication in this analysis is that the policy variables are to some degree endogenous. Accommodation is probably offered more often to workers who want to continue working. Allowance rates are chosen by states on the basis of federal policy and local choices and probably in part on the health condition of workers in the state. Therefore, our estimates are upper bounds of these policy effects. Still, we believe we provide evidence that the social environment faced by workers with work-limiting health conditions can significantly influence their decision to apply for DI benefits, holding their specific health conditions constant. 相似文献
882.
This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999. 相似文献
883.
The so-called devolution revolution was a significant themein American federalism in the 1990s. Opinions on the issue varywidely. Some suggest that "major changes" occurred in intergovernmentalrelations. Others were pessimistic about the occurrence of anydevolution during the decade. We investigated changes in intergovernmentalrelations between the national and state governments in the1990s on the basis of Elazar's approach to American federalisminvolving: (1) administration, (2) cooperation and coercion,and (3) regulation. We used American State Administrator's Project(ASAP) data collected in 1994 and 1998 to access state administrators'perceptions of national fiscal and regulatory impacts on stateagencies. We conclude that state administrators' perceptionof national fiscal and regulatory impacts changed only moderatelyfrom 1994 to 1998, and that evolution rather than revolutiondescribes better the character of state-national intergovernmentalchanges during the 1990s. 相似文献
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Millns S 《Parliamentary Affairs》2001,54(3):475-494
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