The regular article tracking developments at the national level in key European countries in the area of IT and communications – Co-ordinated by Herbert Smith LLP and contributed to by firms across Europe

This column provides a concise alerting service of important national developments in key European countries. Part of its purpose is to compliment the Journal's feature articles and Briefing Notes by keeping readers abreast of what is currently happening “on the ground” at a national level in implementing EU level legislation and international conventions and treaties. Where an item of European National News is of particular significance, CLSR may also cover it in more detail in the current or a subsequent edition.     

Air and Space Power, Lead Turning, the Future

To optimize security investment for the future, the Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt an approach that rewards the services for developing innovative methods to attain national security objectives with the least risk in both blood and treasure. To accomplish this, the DoD may have to re-visit its former practice of providing each service with relatively equal slices of the military budget. Under such an approach, the services are motivated to make incremental changes to the concepts and weapons of the previous war and have little reason to take risks to increase productivity of man and machine alike. What is needed—particularly in these times of increasingly complex national security challenges, rising costs, and shrinking budgets—is a plan for going forward that is centered on a shared vision of the variety of threat conditions we are likely to face, an honest evaluation of their significance, and a mature appraisal of what will be required to deal with them. We should dedicate ourselves to crafting an overall defense strategy that will allow us to shape the environment and act flexibly across the entire range of operations, and that will also provide a framework upon which to base our jointly focused resource and investment decisions.¹     

Beyond Heterodoxy: Dwight Waldo and the Politics–Administration Dichotomy

Dwight Waldo (1913–2000) is commonly known as a “heterodox” critic of the dichotomy between politics and administration. But is this reputation supported by his writings? It seems to be primarily based on The Administrative State (1948) and other early publications, in which he conceptualized politics/administration narrowly as deciding/executing and, indeed, sharply criticized it. Waldo’s later publications, by contrast, offer much broader conceptualizations and a more ambivalent, even positive appraisal of the dichotomy. Such conceptualizations are also found in an important unpublished book Waldo worked on during several phases of his career. On the basis of these published and unpublished writings, we should reconsider Waldo’s reputation and, pursuing his line of reasoning, reconceptualize the politics–administration dichotomy as a layered construct and reappreciate it as a constitutional doctrine.     

Hyping and Spin-doctoring - the UK Network Antidote

The development of e-commerce, the stability of networks, the drive for greater bandwidth and the voice/data convergence are areas affecting a wide range of computer professionals. The field is clouded by manufacturers hyping their own products and industry factions spin-doctoring new technologies. This research, involving 764 networking professionals from a spectrum of UK businesses provides a snapshot of the current situation.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.