China and India: Economic Ties and Strategic Rivalry

How well do theories of economic interdependence and structural realism explain the India-China divergence between growing economic relations and continuing strategic mistrust? This article looks at the Indian side and argues that we need to go beyond economic and strategic factors, and brings in a more contingent approach based on domestic elite discourse and thinking. The article suggests that a more nuanced and complex debate on China is emerging in India than that posited by interdependence or realism, a debate that is framed by what I term nationalist, realist and globalist schools of thought, with the latter two groups currently holding the center of gravity.     

Descending Eagle: The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review & the Decline of U.S. Power

This article reviews power transition theory and emerging threats to U.S. national security. It then analyzes how the 2014 QDR will ensure U.S. relative power decline and how the strategy fails to effectively counter the rise of China and Russia as challenger states in the international system. Finally, several policy options are proposed to address the deficiencies of the QDR and to counter an increasingly aggressive China and revisionist Russia.     

‘Ali Baba's Cave’: The Sea of Okhotsk's Contentious Triangle

Amidst international furor over its annexation of Crimea, Russia quietly acquired a far more lucrative territory through different means: in March, the United Nations recognized Russia's claim to the resource-rich “Peanut Hole” in the center of the Sea of Okhotsk. This strategically and economically important body of water—a “real Ali Baba's cave” of untapped oil and gas reserves—lies within a contentious triangle formed by eastern Russia and northern Japan. Securing the Okhotsk's legal status as an internal sea goes far to advancing Russian claims in the Arctic, and bolsters Russia's bargaining position over four disputed Kuril islands which Japan callsits “Northern Territories.”     

Theory as Thought: Britain and German Unification

Inspired by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein's call for analytic eclecticism and making use of newly available, previously classified archival documents, we distill the essential logics of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism and examine their role in shaping the debates amongst British policymakers in the context of German unification in 1989-90. We find that, although all the theoretical logics help shape the policymaking surrounding unification, none stands alone as a basis for understanding social reality. Indeed, all functioned together as British policymakers thought in terms of theory to make sense of German unification. The logic of realism clearly played an important role in shaping the perceptions of top British leadership, particularly Margaret Thatcher, of German unification as a problem. But realism did not determine the solution to the "problem." Instead, British policymakers drew on the logic embedded in neoliberal institutionalism, turning to institutions to manage the unification process. The reason for this can be found in the role of constructivist logics-particularly identity and rhetorical entrapment-that constrained British policymakers to cooperative policy options. By taking this approach, this article makes several important contributions. First, it sheds light on British policy during a critical historical moment. Second, it significantly improves understanding regarding Germany's historical and current place in Europe. Third, it ties major theoretical traditions together through a foreign policy analytical approach, and in the process suggests that many of the theoretical boundaries separating scholars are overdrawn. Finally, the article pushes international relations scholars to keep in mind the complex relationship between reality and theory. In the final analysis, bringing to bear these three perspectives highlights the complexity of the processes that produced British policy-and by extension those that shaped German unification-as well as the importance of breaking free of the strictures of the ideas versus materiality debate.     

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

While international cooperation research emphasizes institutional design, states mostly interact with existing organizations. How do states choose organizations for cooperation? We develop a theory of agency choice for development projects, emphasizing the importance of domestic institutions, the scope of cooperation, and the resources of the implementing agency. If states are to cooperate with funding agencies that have abundant resources, such as the World Bank, they must accept more stringent conditions on project implementation. We argue states accept the stringent conditions that resourceful organizations demand if the public goods from project implementation are highly valuable. Empirically, this is the case for democratic states, large projects, and projects that produce national instead of global public goods. We test this theory using data on 2,882 Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects, 1991–2011. The GEF offers an ideal case because various implementing agencies are responsible for the actual projects. States implement projects in collaboration with the World Bank, which has the most expertise and resources among the GEF’s implementing agencies, if their regime type is democracy, the project size is large, and the benefits are primarily national. Qualitative evidence sheds light on causal mechanisms.     

A New Strategy to Defeat Al-Qaeda in Yemen

While unmanned aerial drone strikes in Yemen are a stopgap measure to degrade the operational strength of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), any long-term strategy focused on success must actively enlist local communities in their own defense in order to defeat the terrorist organization. The United States must move beyond a “butcher-and-bolt” approach and adopt a “forward strategy” focused on mobilizing the local population to confront AQAP while providing communities with realistic good governance, development, and reconstruction initiatives.     

Egypt's Wall with Gaza & the Emergence of a New Middle East Alignment

In December 2009, Egypt began construction of an underground steel wall on its border with Gaza in a move designed to halt the smuggling of illegal weapons and other contraband via the Hamas-run underground tunnel network. Egypt's initiative, which is being carried out in the name of its own strategic-national interests, has been the subject of intense criticism throughout the region. This article examines the emergence of a new alignment in the Middle East, based upon a new fault line between moderates and radicals. This alignment is manifested in Egypt's construction of its underground steel wall. By exploring the motivations, responses, and implications of building such a wall, it will become apparent that two camps have emerged in the region on this issue and that their stances are but an illustration of the aforementioned shift.     

Strategic Consequences of Radical Islamic Neofundamentalism

Militarized Islamic neofundamentalism is a modern and essentially violent ideology. As an ideology, it cannot be killed, but instead must be supplanted. The strategic objective of defeating the ideology is distinct from, and sometimes in conflict with, the tactical objective of combating terrorists. Managing this tension requires the war on terror to be conceived in essentially political terms, which in turn requires a realignment of U.S. security policy.     

The Muslim Middle East: Is There a Democratic Option?

American counterterrorism strategy defines as “moderate” or “mainstream” any Muslim who does not support the jihadi extremists, which sets the bar very low and does not consider the question of how widespread such support actually might be. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is not the lunatic fringe of Sunni Islam—it is the fanatic core of Sunni Islam, and shares much of its ideology with other organized Islamic groups and, for that matter, much of the Muslim faithful. “Moderate” Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are moderate only in relative terms, are mostly antidemocratic, and are more correctly considered nonviolent enemies of the U.S. This being the case, a democratic opening in the Muslim Middle East is all too likely to bring to power profoundly antidemocratic groups that are virulently and possibly violently hostile to the U.S. A possible alternative strategy is one stressing good government, with gradual democratization as societies decompress.