Fair models of political fairness

Abstract. In this note we study different methods of aggregation of preferences met on the occasion of elections. Through a simple geometrical representation, we analyse several of their properties, in particular those linked to Arrow's theorem for ordinal rankings; we pursue this discussion in the case of cardinal rankings, the qualities of which convince us of the usefulness of experiencing their introduction in real ballots.     

Legal considerations of sleep deprivation among resident physicians

Medical training in the United States often takes the form of a grueling endurance test in which patients are often those most at risk. This Article discusses sleep deprivation among resident physicians in the United States with an eye towards resolving the problem through legal channels. It analyzes the effects of sleep deprivation on resident physicians, with subsequent discussion of the implications for patient care and medical training. Next, it makes comparisons to medical training in other developed nations, as well as regulations that exist in the airline and trucking industries, where public safety is a principal concern. Furthermore, this Article discusses proposals to mend the dilemmas created by sleep-deprived resident physicians through statutory and regulatory reform, deterrence by way of tort law, and unionization or collective bargaining.     

From North Atlantic Neoliberalism to Market Pluralism

This article is based on the ideas contained in a longer essay by the two authors in the Winter issue of Challenge magazine. It was adapted by NPQ editor Nathan Gardels and approved and corrected by Salinas.     

ONE FIGHT,ONE TEAM: THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE,FRAGMENTATION AND INFORMATION

In its report published in 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the ‘9/11 Commission’) analyses the functioning of the Intelligence Community (ICo). It indicates that the ICo is both over‐fragmented and guilty of not sharing enough information. The Commission recommends that central control of the ICo needs to be strengthened and that more incentives for information‐sharing should be designed. This article takes a critical look at these two recommendations. Sharing information carries major risks and is therefore not something that can take place as a matter of course. Moreover, information has to be subject to a selection process before it can be shared. This selection cannot be measured objectively, so mistakes in the selection are unavoidable. Strengthening central control also poses risks: it engenders more battles over territory, it does not improve understanding of the capillaries of the organization – the capillaries being where the primary processes of information gathering, validation and assessment take place – and it involves the destruction of checks and balances. Fragmentation may even be functional since it leads to redundancy, itself a safeguard against the risk of misselecting relevant information.