A Reasonable Balance of Law and Sentiment: Social Order in Democratic Taiwan from the Policeman's Point of View

Taiwan's political democratization has engendered a contradiction in its legal regime: consolidation of rule of law at the macro-institutional level is matched by the persistent marginalization of legal authority in ground-level social practices. This article uses an ethnographic study of neighborhood police to explore certain practical and structural elements involved in maintaining this contradictory sociopolitical order. I examine some of the processes through which state authority is invoked and applied to the policing of public space, focusing on the ideals of legitimacy that animate these processes. The argument of the article is that historical and cultural factors embodied in contemporary Taiwan's "idea of police"—exemplified in the trope of a balance between reason, law, and sentiment—are crucial to understanding how solidification of the rule of law within state institutions is kept within the boundaries of a social sensibility that does not take law as the last word.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

Intellectual Property Theft and Organized Crime: The Case of Film Piracy

This article seeks to understand the processes by which the crime of intellectual property theft is organized, with specific attention given to film piracy. It seeks to identify the structure and function of the criminal enterprises engaged in this crime and assess the degree to which organized crime is involved with film piracy. An analysis of available sources reveals that general conclusions about the relationship of organized crime to film piracy results from a lack of useable and verifiable information in media, government, and industry sources. In the absence of independent, substantive analysis, anecdote and industry interests currently drive public policies and legal developments created to address the role of organized crime in film piracy. In the United States and across the globe, seizures, criminal indictments, civil actions, and public awareness are up considerably. Whether or not these advances can be maintained in the face of technological advances, the evolution of industry economic structures, and consumer indifference to the stigma of intellectual property theft and concern at industry response to such theft remains to be seen. Specific recommendations for future research are offered. The author would like to thank the International Center of the National Institute of Justice for soliciting funding this research through a grant, Intellectual Property and Organized Crime. He also Thanks Jay S. Albanese and his the anonymous reviewers of this work for their helpful comments and criticisms. This article only reflects the findings of the author, not the National Institute of Justice, Dr. Albanese or the reviewers.